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INTRODUCTION

Recreational activities, from skiing, white water rafting and
mountain climbing to mountain biking or bronc riding, involve inherent risks that provide the challenge and excitement enticing individuals to participate. How should the responsibility for recreational
risks be allocated between the participant and the provider? Does the
answer change if the recreational activities are important to the economy of the state where an injury occurs? These are some of the
questions that have troubled judges, juries and legislatures for many
years, especially in the context of downhill skiing injuries.
Under the common law, the "volenti non fit injuria"' doctrine
prescribed that a recreational activity provider owed no duty to protect a participant from injuries resulting from the inherent risks of
the particular sport. 2 As the law evolved, however, courts gradually

1."He who consents cannot receive an injury." BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 1746 (4th
ed. 1968).
2. Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co., 166 N.E. 173, 174 (N.Y. 1929). Judge Cardozo held:
Volenti non fit injuria. One who takes part in such a sport accepts the dangers that
inhere in it so far as they are obvious and necessary, just as a fencer accepts the
risk of a thrust by his antagonist or a spectator at a ball game the chance of contact
with the ball ... The antics of the clown are not the paces of the cloistered cleric.
The rough and boisterous joke, the horseplay of the crowd, evokes its own guffaws,
but they are not the pleasures of tranquility. The plaintiff was not seeking a retreat
for meditation. Visitors were tumbling about the belt to the merriment of onlookers
when he made his choice to join them. He took the chance of like fate, with whatever
damage to his body might ensue from such a fall. The timorous may stay at home.
(Emphasis added).
Id. at 173. Judge Cardozo's opinion is based upon the doctrine of primary assumption of risk
and an English case, Cruden v. Fentham, 170 Eng. Rep. 496 (Esp. 1799).
In Wright v. Mt. Mansfield Lift, Inc., this doctrine was applied to the recreation industry
in the skiing context. 96 F. Supp. 786 (D. Vt. 1951). Wright was the first case to hold that
in the recreation industry, a skier could not recover for injuries caused by the "inherent dangers" of the sport. The Wright court, applying the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria, found
Mt. Mansfield had no duty to protect the plaintiff from a snow covered stump, an inherent
danger of the sport. Id. at 791. The district court directed a verdict for defendants. Id. at
792.
See also Arthur B. Ferguson, Jr., Allocation of the Risks of Skiing: A Callfor the Reapplication of Fundamental Common Law Principles, 67 DENv. U. L. Rav. 165, 189 note 142
(1990) [hereinafter Ferguson], for examples of cases utilizing the inherent risk doctrine in the
recreational context.
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increased the scope of a recreation provider's legal duty.3 Further-4
more, most state legislatures enacted comparative negligence laws.
As a result, primary and secondary assumption of risk were often
mistakenly lumped together, severely limiting the effective use of a
duty analysis to prevent recovery against recreation providers in appropriate circumstances. 5 Instead a legal duty was almost presumed,
the inherent risk doctrine was largely ignored, and assumption of risk
was simply viewed as a "factor" in a judge or jury's comparative
7
fault determination. 6 The timorous need no longer stay at home.
Fear of rising insurance costs and large jury verdicts forced the
nation's ski industry to look aggressively at legislation.' Wyoming,

3. See infra notes 43-90 and accompanying text.
4. Wisconsin was the first state to adopt comparative negligence laws in 1963, with other
states following closely thereafter. WIS. STAT. At. § 895.045 (1983). Wyoming passed its
modified comparative negligence scheme in 1973, see Wyo. STAT. § 1-1-109 (Supp. 1992). See
further discussion of the interaction between the doctrine of primary assumption of risk and
comparative negligence, infra notes 91-96 and accompanying text.
5. Comparative negligence technically should have no impact upon the doctrine of primary assumption of risk. W. PAoE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 68, at 496-97 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter Keeton et. al.[. "[Alssumption of risk in this
[primary] form is really a principle of no duty, or no negligence, and so denies the existence
of any underlying cause of action. Without a breach of duty by the defendant, there is thus
logically nothing to compare with any misconduct of the plaintiff." Id. See also notes 91-96
and accompanying text.
Even prior to the advent of comparative negligence laws, the primary assumption of risk
doctrine was oftentimes viewed as an assumption of risk defense. Meistrich v. Casino Arena
Attractions, Inc., 155 A.2d 90, 93 (N.J. 1959). Viewed as secondary assumption of risk, or
contributory negligence, the plaintiff's conduct is seen as a defense to a given breach of duty
by defendant. Id. See also infra notes 31-40 and accompanying text.
6. E.g. Mannhard v. Clear Creek Skiing Corporation, 682 P.2d 64 (Colo.Ct.App. 1984)
(plaintiff's decedent killed in avalanche triggered by entering out-of-bounds area, with jury
finding both skier and operator 50% negligent and awarding damages); Rosen v. LTV Recreational Development, Inc., 569 F.2d. 1117, 1121 (10th Cir. 1978)(plaintiff seriously injured
when collision with skier hurled him into metal pole on ski slope, with judge affirming jury
fimding defendant 100% negligent and awarding plaintiff $200,000). In neither Mannhard nor
Rosen did the court determine, or submit to the jury, the issue of whether or not the risk was
inherent. Id.
In Sunday v. Stratton, the plaintiff was rendered a quadriplegic when he allegedly tripped
over some snow covered brush. 390 A.2d 398 (Vt. 1978). The Supreme Court of Vermont
affirmed the superior court's entry of a jury verdict attributing 100% negligence to the ski
area and awarding the plaintiff $1,500,000. This case sent a wave of panic through the recreation
industry, particularly the ski industry. See supra note 2 and infra notes 64-73 and accompanying
text.
7. While in Murphy, Judge Cardozo warned the timorous to stay at home, (see supra
note 2) the Sunday decision sent this new message. 390 A.2d at 398. Ferguson, supra note 2
at 171 and Carl H. Lisman, Ski Injury Liability, 43 U. Co. L. Rav. 307, 315 (1972) [hereinafter
Lisman].
8. Abominable Snow Suits was the title of a lead article in TIME, January 16, 1978
at 60. In the TIME article, a representative of Kendall Insurance Company decried the possibility of skyrocketing insurance rates or the unavailability of ski area liability insurance sometime in the future if the courts continued to follow the ruling of Sunday. The United States
ski industry undertook a nationwide effort to reduce exposure to suits arising out of inherent
risk injuries. See Michael J. Farrow, Ski Operatorsand Skiers-Responsibility and Liability, 14
NEw ENo. L. REv. 260, 268 & n.68 (1978) [hereinafter Farrow].
The insurance crisis did ensue. For analyses of the causes and affects of the insurance
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along with a cast of other states, moved to enact legislation attempting to redefine and codify the various duties and liabilities of participants and providers involved in recreational activities. 9 The
sentiment was strong in many states like Wyoming, where recreation
had become an important sector of declining state economies.' 0
The popular sport of skiing has been the focus of most of these
types of legislative enactments and has generated a substantial amount
of case law." Therefore, this article will focus specifically on the sport
of skiing in examining the evolution of the inherent risk doctrine and
led to the perceived need for legislation to
the circumstances which
12
better define the law.

crisis, see generally: Henry J. Reske, Was There A Liability Crisis? A.B.A JRNL., January
1989; Franklin W. Nutter, The Insurance Wars, The Battle Over McCarran Ferguson, A.B.A,
T m BaIF, Vol. 18, No. 2 Winter 1989; Kenneth S. Abraham, The Causes of the Insurance
Crisis, THE ACADEMY OF PoLITCAL SCIENCE, NEw DIRECTIONS IN LIArnLrry LAW, Vol. 37,
No. 1, 1988; I. William Berry, The Great InsuranceFallout, SKI, January, 1989 at 45-5 1; Taking
a Dip in the Insurance Shark Tank, SKI AREA MANAGEMENT, Summer, 1988 at 12; George J.
Church, Sorry America Your InsuranceHas Been Canceled - Those Dreaded Words Echo With
Numbing Frequency In An America Well On Its Way To Insuring Itse(f Into A Silly, Shuddering
Halt, TIME, March 24, 1986 at 16.
9. Wyoming Recreational Safety Act, Wyo. STAT. §§ 1-1-121 to 123 (Supp. 1991); See
also, Snow Safety Act, ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.135 (1965 & Supp. 1991); Ski Safety and Liability
Act, CoLo. REv. STAT. §§ 3344-101 to 114 (1984 & Supp. 1991); Passenger Tramways, CONN.
GEN. STAT. §§ 29-201 to 214 (1991); Responsibilities and Liabilities of Skiers & Ski Area
Operators, IDAHO CODE §§ 6-1101 to 1109 (1979 & Supp. 1992); Skiers' and Tramway Passengers' Responsibilities, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 488 to 490 (1964); Recreational Tramways (ski operators and skiers responsibilities and liability), MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 143,
§§ 71H to 71Q (1981 & Supp. 1991); Ski Area Safety Act, MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 18.483(1)
to (21) (1986 & Supp. 1992); Skier's Assumption of Responsibility, MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 232-731 to 737 (1991); Skier Safety Act, NEe. REv. STAT. §§ 455A.010 to .190 (1991); Skiers,
Ski Area and Passenger Tramway Safety, N.H. Rv. STAT. ANN. §§ 225-A:1 to 26 (1989 &
Supp. 1991); Skiing, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 5:13-1 to 11 (1982 & Supp. 1992); Ski Safety Act,
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-15-1 to 14 (1978 & Supp. 1991); Safety in Skiing Act, N.Y. LABOR
LAW §§ 865-868 (1988); Actions Relating to Skier Safety and Skiing Accidents, N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 99C-1 to 5 (1985); Skiing Responsibility Act, N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 53-09-01 to 11
(1989); Skiing Safety, OIo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 4169.01 (1989 & Supp. 1991); Skiing Activities,
OR. REv. STAT. §§ 30.970 to 990 (1991); Comparative Negligence, PA. CONS. STAT. 42 § 7102
(1982 & Supp. 1992); Responsibility and Liability of Ski Operators and Skiers, R.I. GEN LAWS
99 41-8-1 to 4 (1990); Ski Area Safety and Liability, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 68-48-101 to 107
(1987 & Supp. 1991); Passenger Tramways, Inherent Risk of Skiing, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 7827-51 to 58 (1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1037 (1973 & Supp. 1991); Skiing and Commercial
Ski Activity, WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 70.117.010 to 117.040 (1992); Ski Responsibility Act,
W. VA. CODE §§ 20-3A-1 to 8 (1989 & Supp. 1992); Participation in Recreational Activities,
WiS. STAT. ANN. § 895.525 (1991).
10. In the late 1970's, the Arab oil embargo contributed to creating an oil and gas boom
in Wyoming. That boom was turning to bust in the mid 1980's. The agricultural and livestock
industries also suffered general downturns. Natural beauty, recreation, wildlife and the related
travel and tourism industries were perceived as less affected by these cycles and were quickly
gaining strength as major economic forces. In 1985, tourism was the second largest revenue
source for the state bringing in revenues of about $800 million with agriculture at about $600
million and the assessed value of minerals produced at about $7 billion. In 1989 tourism produced revenues of about $1.5 billion and provided about 30,000 full time jobs. Recreation and
tourism is clearly a relatively stable and growing industry. DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION
AND INFORMATION, WYOMING DATA HANDBooK (1989).
11. See supra note 9; infra note 12.
12. See infra notes 43-90 and accompanying text. The Wyoming Supreme Court has not

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol28/iss1/4

4

Hansen and Duerr: Recreation Injuries & (and) Inherent Risks: Wyoming's Recreation

1993

RECREATION SAFETY ACT

This article will then focus specifically on Wyoming's statutory
enactment, the Recreation Safety Act (the "Act").' 3 The Wyoming
Supreme Court has not yet interpreted this statute.' 4 This article will
therefore explore the meaning and intended scope of the Act and 5 its
necessary interaction with Wyoming statutory and common law.'
This article will then focus on the pros and cons of enacting this6
particular type of legislation versus variations adopted by other states.,
Finally, the article will propose an analytical framework, incorporating both common law principles and social policy, within which
the judiciary can effectively utilize the Act to assist in defining the
scope of duties/responsibilities
in this increasingly important segment
7
of Wyoming's economy.
II. BACKGROUND

The sport of skiing has generated a large amount of case law in
the recreational tort area, and is the focus of the majority of states'
"inherent risk" legislation.' This case law therefore provides an appropriate focus for examining the history of the inherent risk doctrine
and its necessary interaction with premises liability law.

analyzed the primary assumption of risk doctrine in the context of the inherent risks of skiing
or any other recreational activity. However, the court has extensively analyzed the primary
assumption of risk doctrine in the context of the obvious danger rule. See, O'Donnell v. City
of Casper, 696 P.2d 1278, 1281-84 (Wyo. 1985). The inherent risk doctrine and obvious danger
rule are both primary assumption of risk concepts. The striking similarity between the two
doctrines provides a good vantage point from which to view how the Wyoming Supreme Court
might have analyzed the inherent risk doctrine prior to legislative enactment. See infra notes
97-109 and accompanying text. But see infra note 97, (obvious danger rule is a premises liability
doctrine and inherent risk doctrine can apply either in or out of the premises liability context).
13. See infra note 133. The Act should be distinguished from Wyoming's Recreational
Use Statute codified at Wyo. STAT. §§ 34-19-101-06 (1989). Like other states' recreational use
statutes, the Wyoming version limits a land possessor's duty to individuals who come upon
the land for recreational purposes. Id. See infra notes 194-210 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the interaction between the Act and the Recreational Use Statute. See also Michael
K. Davis, Landowner Liability Under the Wyoming Recreational Use Statute, 15 LAND &
WATER L. Rav. 649 (1980)[hereinafter Davis], for a thorough discussion of this statute.
14. But see Judge Johnson's unpublished opinion in Johnson v. United States, C.A. No.
C89-0220J (on appeal, 949 F.2d 332 (10th Cir. 1991)). That case involved a hiker death in
Grand Teton National Park, occurring prior to the effective date of the Recreational Safety
Act. Judge Johnson granted summary judgment for the United States on other grounds, but
noted in dictum that: "Wyoming Law now bars law suits for injuries and death arising from
similar incidents occurring after June 1989." The Judge then quoted § 1-1-123(a) of the Act
in footnote 2 of his opinion. Id.
15. For a discussion of the Act and Wyoming's Comparative Negligence Laws, see infra
notes 170-179 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the Act's interaction with common
law premises liability, the Recreational Use Statute and the Skier Responsibility Statute, see
infra notes 180-215 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 235-240 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 224-234 and accompanying text.
18. See supra note 9. Wyoming, Vermont and Wisconsin are the only states which have
adopted legislation coyering all recreational sports; see infra note 121.
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Premises Liability and Inherent Dangers

Downhill skiing necessarily involves the use of outdoor premises.
As a result, ski law has interphased with premises liability law
throughout its history. In Wright v. Mt. Mansfield, the Vermont Supreme Court was the first court to officially adopt the inherent risk
doctrine in ski cases.' 9 However, the court adopted the inherent risk
doctrine within the context of premises liability law. The court noted
that the defendant ski area owed plaintiff invitees a duty to advise
them "of any dangers which reasonable prudence would have foreseen and corrected." 2 The court found that, under the doctrine of
volenti non fit injuria, the defendant's duty did not extend to warning
plaintiffs of the21 dangers inherent in the sport, in this case a snow
covered stump:
The plaintiff, in hitting the snow covered stump as she claims
to have hit, was merely accepting a danger that inheres in the
sport of skiing. To hold that the terrain of a ski trail down
a mighty mountain, with fluctuation in weather and snow conditions that constantly change its appearance and slipperiness,
should be kept level and smooth, free from holes or depressions, equally safe for the adult or the child, would be to
demand the impossible. It cannot be that there is any duty
imposed on the owner and operator of a ski slope that charges
it with the knowledge of these mutations of nature and requires it to warn the public against such.
In essence, the court held that Mt. Mansfield had fulfilled its duty
of ordinary care to plaintiff invitee, and that such duty did not extend
to protecting plaintiff from the risks inherent in the sport.2

19.'96 F. Supp. 786 (D. Vt. 1951).
20. Id.at 791.
21. Id.
22. The court described in detail the nature of skiing's inherent risks:
Skiing is a sport; a sport that entices thousands of people; a sport that requires an
ability on the part of the skier to handle himself or herself under various circumstances of grade, boundary, mid-trail obstructions, corners and varied conditions of
the snow. Secondly, it requires good judgment on the part of the skier and recognition
of the existing circumstances and conditions. Only the skier knows his own ability
to cope with a certain piece of trail. Snow, ranging from powder to ice, can be of
infinite kinds. Breakable crust may be encountered where soft snow is expected. Roots
and rocks may be hidden under a thin cover. A single thin stubble of cut brush can
trip a skier in the middle of a turn. Sticky snow may follow a fast running surface
without warning. Skiing conditions may change quickly. What was, a short time
before, a perfect surface with a soft cover on all bumps may fairly rapidly become
filled with ruts, worn spots and other manner of skier created hazards.
Wright, 96 F. Supp. at 791.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol28/iss1/4
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The traditional classifications for those using another's land are
that of invitee, licensee or trespasser.Y A possessor of land2 must
exercise reasonable care with respect to an invitee. 25 The possessor
has a duty to make the land safe for entry, including the duty to
inspect the land, and make any repairs or warnings reasonably prudent under the circumstances 36Having paid a fee for use of the ski
area, the participant is most often classified as an invitee .27Following
the Wright case, many courts continued to invoke the inherent risk
doctrine
within the parameters of the ski operator's duty to an in2s
vitee.
B.

Primary vs. Secondary Assumption of Risk

Beginning with Wright and Murphy, courts have associated the
inherent risk doctrine with "assumption of risk." The Wright court
held: "[V]olenti non fit injuria applies. One who takes part in such
a sport accepts the dangers that inhere in it so far as they are obvious
and necessary." ' 29 The court employed the primary assumption of risk
doctrine to find that, as a matter of law, Mt. Mansfield owed no

23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 329 to 331 (1965). An invitee can be either a
public invitee or a business visitor. In either case, the invitee has an express invitation to remain
on the premises. A licensee is one only entitled to remain on the premises because of the
possessor's consent. A trespasser is one who enters upon the premises without the possessor's
consent. Id. See also, Yalowizer v. Husky Oil Co., 629 P.2d 465, 467 (Wyo. 1981). Many
states, such as California, have overruled these traditional classifications and adopted a reasonable man standard; the landowner has a duty of reasonable care to all who enter upon his
property. See, Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968). In Rowland, the court noted
that the party's status might have some bearing on liability, but would not be determinative.
Id. at 568. Wyoming has retained the traditional classifications. See, Yalowizer, wherein the
Wyoming Supreme Court discusses the Rowland rule and refuses to adopt a reasonable man
standard. Yalowizer, 629 P.2d at 465.
24. Possessor of land is defined to include a person who is or has been in possession
of the land with "intent to control it." RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 328E (1965).
25. Id. § 343 and cmt. b.
26. Id. § 343 and cmt. b. Wyoming generally follows the Restatement position regarding
duties owed to invitees. See, Radosevich v. Board of County Commissioners, 776 P.2d 747,
749 (Wyo. 1989); McKee v. Pacific Power & Light, 417 P.2d 426, 429 (Wyo. 1966). However,
the Wyoming Supreme Court has rejected the Restatement position regarding duties owed to
licensees. Under Wyoming law, a possessor owes a licensee and a trespasser a duty only to
refrain from willful or wanton injury. See, Holland v. Weyher/Livsey Constructors, Inc., 651
F. Supp. 409, 415-16 (D. Wyo. 1987); Yalowizer, 629 P.2d at 466, 469-70; Maher v. City of
Casper, 219 P.2d 125, 127 (Wyo. 1950). Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 342
(1965) (additional duty of possessor of land to exercise reasonable care to licensee to warn of
or make safe any known or reasonably discoverable dangers). See infra notes 183-93 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Act's interaction with Wyoming premises liability law.
27. See, e.g., Codd v. Stevens Pass, Inc., 725 P.2d 1008, 1010 (Wash. 1986) and cases
cited infra notes 43-90 and accompanying text.
28. See, e.g., Sunday v. Stratton, 390 A.2d 398, 402 (Vt. 1978) (Duty to invitee to give
warning of reasonably discoverable hidden danger); Burke v. Ski America, Inc., 940 F.2d 95,
97 (4th Cir. 1991) (Duty to invitee only if no inherent danger and danger of premises not
obvious); Daniely v. Goldmine Ski Associates, Inc., 266 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1990) (Duty to invitee
does not extend to obvious dangers); and cases cited infra notes 43-90 and accompanying text.
29. Wright v. Mt. Mansfield Lift, Inc., 96 F. Supp. 786,791 (D. Vt. 1951).
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legal duty to plaintiff for injuries which resulted from risks inherent
in the sport.3 0
Following Wright, the term "assumption of risk" has repeatedly
been used in reference to the inherent risk doctrine. This usage has
resulted in a varied and inconsistent application of the doctrine.
Therefore it is important to identify the relationship between these
concepts and how they have been applied in the context of skiing
litigation.
Assumption of risk is most often referred to as a "defense" to
an action for negligence. A plaintiff presents a prima facie case of
negligence31 , and defendant responds with the affirmative defense that
plaintiff assumed the risk of injury. Defendant then has the burden
of proving the elements of the assumption of risk defense. 3 2 This
"secondary assumption of risk" is a form of contributory negligence
and a defense to an established breach of duty.33 The determination
of the presence or absence of assumption of risk/contributory negligence is a question of fact for the trier of fact.Y
Primary assumption of risk, although called "assumption of risk,"
has historically not been a defense,"

30. Id. Although this was not clearly expressed in the opinion, a commentator notes that
this was precisely the basis of the court's decision:
The court in Wright did not find the area operator negligent. Since assumption of
risk in its secondary sense is an affirmative defense invoked only after the negligence
of defendant has been established, the court could not have applied the doctrine of
secondary assumption of risk.
Id. Robert C. Manby, Assumption of Risk after Sunday v. Stratton Corporation: The Vermont
Sports Injury Liability Statute and Injured Skiers, 3 VT. L. Rav. 139. (1978). One commentator
noted that "[a] careful reading of the court's authority, Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement
Co. ... suggests that it is the negation of any duty rather than the assumption of risk which
is conclusive." Lisman, supra, note 7 at 316..
31. The elements of a cause of action in negligence are: (1) a legal duty, (2) breach of
the legal duty, (3) proximate cause and 4) damages. Pine Creek Canal No. I v. Stadler, 685
P.2d 13, 16 (Wyo. 1984). Plaintiff has the burden of proving the elements of his prima facie
case. Id. See also, RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 328A (1965).
32. The elements of the classic defense are that plaintiff voluntarily encountered the risk
with knowledge and appreciation of the danger. Prosser, supra note 5, § 68 at 486-87.
33. Meistrich v. Casino Area Attractions, Inc., 155 A.2d 90, 93 (N.J. 1959). Prior to
the advent of comparative negligence laws the successful application of the defense of assumption of risk completely barred plaintiff's ability to recover. Following the enactment of
comparative negligence laws, the assumption of risk defense was merged into contributory
negligence, allowing a comparison of fault. Keeton et. al., supra note 5 at 496; infra notes
91-96. (Express assumption of risk, wherein the plaintiff agrees in writing or otherwise to relieve
defendant of any duty owed is excluded from this discussion. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 496B (1965), for an explanation of that doctrine.
34. Keeton et. al., supra note 5 at 455. Wyoming follows this rule: "contributory negligence and assumption of risk can become questions of law in only the clearest of cases and
are usually jury questions." Anderson v. Schulz, 527 P.2d 151, 152-53 (Wyo. 1974).
35. Charles Warren, Volenti Non Fit Injuria in Actions of Negligence, 8 HAvy. L. REv.
457, 458-59 (1895). Warren notes that the maxim "Volenti non fit injuria" is "strictly not a
defence, but a rule of law regarding a plaintiff's conduct which forms a bar to a suit brought
by him . . . [it] is really proof of no basis to a right of action." Accord: FOWLER F. HARPER
ET AL.. Tim LAW OF TORTS § 21.0 at 189 & note 2, Vol. 4 (1986).
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In its primary sense the plaintiff's assumption of a risk is only

the counterpart of the defendant's lack of duty to protect the
plaintiff from that risk. In such a case plaintiff may not recover for his injury even though he was
quite reasonable in
36
encountering it. Volenti non fit injuria.
In Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., the New Jersey
which has surSupreme Court succinctly outlined the 3confusion
7
rounded the assumption of risk doctrine:
In one sense (sometimes called its "primary" sense) it is an
alternate expression for the proposition that defendant was
not negligent, i.e. either owed no duty or did not breach the

duty owed. In its other sense (sometimes called "secondary"),
assumption of risk is an affirmative defense to an established
breach of duty. 8
Unlike the defense of secondary assumption of risk, the determination
of the presence or absence of a duty (primary assumption of risk)
is a question of law for the court.3 9 Two different legal concepts but
born of the same label-hence the hopeless confusion.40

36. James Fleming, Jr., Assumption of Risk, 61 YALE L.J. 141 (1952) (emphasis added).
37. 155 A.2d at 93 (N.J. 1959).
38. Id. (emphasis added). These distinctions developed in the law of master and servant.
The master was not liable to the servant in negligence for damages resulting from inherent
risks. Therefore, the servant must prove, as part of his prima facie case, the duty owed; or,
that damages resulted from something other than an inherent risk. In this form, it was not a
defense. However, if the servant proved his prima facie case, the master could then assert
assumption of risk as a defense, urging that the servant assumed the risk despite the master's
negligence. The burden of proof was then upon the master to prove the elements of this defense.
Id. at 93. See also Barnette v. Doyle, for a discussion of volenti non fitinjuria in the master/
servant context. 622 P.2d 1349, 1356-59 (Wyo. 1981).
39. Although plaintiff must present facts giving rise to the existence of a legal duty, it
is the court's function to determine, as a matter of law, whether those facts ultimately give
rise to a legal duty. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328 A-B (1965). Wyoming adheres
to these principles. See, e.g., MacKrell v. Bell H2S Safety, 795 P.2d 776, 779 (Wyo. 1990);
Maxted v. Pacific Car & Foundry Co., 527 P.2d 832, 835 (Wyo. 1974).
40. In Meistrich, the court noted that in its primary sense, assumption of risk is a duty
analysis with the burden on plaintiff to demonstrate the existence of a legal duty. Historically,
however, if plaintiff proved his prima facie case, defendant would assert assumption of risk
as an affirmative defense. "Thus two utterly distinct thoughts bore the same label with inevitable
confusion." Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions Inc., 155 A.2d 90, 93 (N.J. 1959), citing
Martin v. Des Moines Edison Light Co., 106 N.W. 359, 363 (1906). The Meistrich court coneluded that the burden of proof under the primary assumption of risk doctrine should remain
with the plaintiff to demonstrate the existence of a legal duty. The court held that the defense
of assumption of risk is merely a phase of contributory negligence and hence, the burden of
proof as to this defense should rest with defendant. Id.
Modern text writers agree; See FOWLER F. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS, § 21.1
(1956); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496G cmt. b & c (1965); Manby, supra note 30
at 138. Some have suggested that the term "assumption of risk" simply be abandoned, leaving
the court with the concepts of negligence and contributory negligence: "[e]xperience ... indicates the term 'assumption of risk' is so apt to create mist that it is better banished from
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Because of the confusion surrounding "primary assumption of
risk", the authors will try to avoid, where possible, any reference to
"assumption of risk" when discussing the inherent risk doctrine. Furthermore, the terms "volenti non fit injuria," "primary assumption
4
of risk," and "inherent risk doctrine" are all interrelated concepts .
Volenti non fit injuria is a primary assumption of risk doctrine that
employs inherent risk analysis to determine the presence or absence
of a legal duty. 42 Therefore, to avoid further confusion, this concept
will be referred to throughout this article as the "inherent risk doctrine."
C.

Post Wright Case Law

Against this muddled backdrop the Wright4 3 court had applied
the inherent risk doctrine to downhill skiing. If plaintiff's injuries
were a result of an inherent risk of the sport, the ski operator owed
plaintiff no legal duty, and thus could not be found negligent." The
Wright court connected the absence of a legal duty directly to the
presence of inherent risks resulting in injury. As skiing liability law
evolved however, some courts strayed from this analysis. Courts be-

the scene. We hope we have heard the last of it." McGrath v. American Cyanamid Co., 196
A.2d 238 (1963); see also James Fleming, Jr., Assumption of Risk: Unhappy Reincarnation,
78 YALE L.J. 185, 186-187 and n.11 (1968-69); Keeton, et al., supra note 5, § 68 at 493 and
note 36.
See also, Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 318 U.S. 54, 68 (1943). Justice Frankfurter
noted in a concurring opinion that:
The phrase "assumption of risk"is an excellent illustration of the extent to which
uncritical use of words bedevils the law. A phrase begins life as a literary expression;
its felicity leads to its lazy repetition; and repetition soon establishes it as a legal
formula, undiscriminatingly used to express different and sometimes contradictory
ideas.
Id.
See also Manby, supra note 30 at 128, 136.
41. See supra notes 2; 31-40 and accompanying text.
42. Id. See also supra note 12; infra notes 97-109 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the obvious danger rule, another primary assumption of risk doctrine.
43. 96 F. Supp. 786, 791 (D.Vt. 1951).
44. Paige Bigelow, Ski Resort Liability for Negligence Under Utah's Inherent Risks of
Skiing Statute, UTAH L. RaV, Vol. I of 1992, 311, 314 (1992); K. Feuerhelm et al., From
Wright to Sunday and Beyond: Is the Law Keeping up with the Skiers?, UTAH L. REv, Vol.
1985, 885, 886 (1985); Wendy A. Faber, Utah's Inherent Risks of Skiing Act: Avalanche from
Capitol Hill, UTAH L. RIv, Vol. 1980, 355, 358 & note 24 (1980); Manby states it another
way,
[wihen a court bars recovery by an injured skier, declaring that the injured person
"assumed the risk," what is really stated is that the defendant area operator fulfilled
the required duty of ordinary care. This is to be distinguished from saying that the
injured skier assumed the risk of the operator's negligence, for the injured skier has
never consented to relieve the operator of hislegal duty of ordinary care. It is simply
that the proximate cause of the injury was not a breach of any duty owed by the
defendant, but rather a danger inherent inthe sport, not within the ambit of the
operator's reasonable control.
Manby, supra note 30 at 139.
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gan examining the operator's duty separately from the presence or

absence of inherent risks or confusing the application
of the doctrines
45
of primary and secondary assumption of risk.
In Kaufman v. State, the New York Court of Claims granted
defendant operator summary judgment, aligning its holding with
Wright." In Kaufman, plaintiff, an expert skier, was injured when
he fell on a rocky bare spot at defendant's ski area. 4' The court
recognized the operator's duty to exercise reasonable care for its invitee and to warn him of "reasonably unforeseeable danger involving
unreasonable risks, of which the owner has knowledge." 4 The court

cited both Wright and Murphy for their espousal of the inherent risk
doctrine and found that the proximate cause of the injury was not

a breach of the operator's duty. 49
In Marietta v. Cliff's Ridge, Inc.,1° the Michigan Supreme Court
affirmed the court of appeals' decision for re-entry of a jury verdict
in plaintiff's favor. In Marietta, plaintiff ski racer was severely injured when he struck a sapling pole gate marker .' The court, em-

phasizing an operator's duty to his invitee, held that there was
sufficient evidence before the jury to find that the duty extended to
construct the marker.5 2

the use of the safest material available to
However, the majority did not apply the inherent risk doctrine."

45. See cases cited infra, notes 46-90 and accompanying text.
In a negligence action, it is the plaintiff's initial burden to present evidence of a duty
owed: i.e. that his injury was not caused by an inherent risk. Therefore, the elements of the
classic defense of assumption of risk (consent, knowledge and appreciation) should not be at
issue. (See supra notes 31-40 and accompanying text). In fact, such concepts are largely implied
because of plaintiff's consent to take part in the sport. See, Wright v. Mt. Mansfield Lft,
Inc., 96 F. Supp. 786, 791 (D.Vt. 1951); Sunday v. Stratton, 390 A.2d 398, 403-04 (Vt. 1978);
REsTATEMENT (SEcoN) OF ToRis § 496G cmts. b & c (1965); Bigelow, supra note 44 at 315;
Betty van der Smissen, Legal Liability and Risk Management for Public and Private Entities
Vol. 1 at 237, 243 (1990).
The Wright court did not contemplate that plaintiff had actual knowledge or appreciated
the dangers of that specific snow covered stump. However, because defendant has the burden
to prove the presence of these three elements under the defense of assumption of risk (Keeton,
et al., supra note 5 at 484 & 486) and the doctrines of primary and secondary assumption of
risk have been so confused, some courts and commentators suggest that such elements must
be proven present at the inherent risk duty analysis stage. See Abigail Holman Harkins, A
Guide to Judicial Interpretation of Maine's Ski Liability Statute: 26 M.R.S.A. 488, ME. BAR
J., Nov. 1991 344, 350; Rosen v. LTV Recreational Development, 569 F.2d 1117, 1121 (10th
Cir. 1978); Smith v. Seven Springs Farm, Inc., 716 F.2d 1002, 1009 (Ct. Ap. Pa. 1983).
46. 172 N.Y.S.2d 276 (Ct.C1.N.Y. 1958).
47. Id.at 278.
48. Id. at 282.
49. Id.at 285. The court noted that if the operator had made specific representations
about the snow conditions on the run, it might have been found to have breached its duty.
Id. at 282. The court fell short of holding that the bare spot was an inherent risk of skiing
or that the proximate cause of the injury was an inherent risk; however, this can be inferred
from a reading of the opinion.
50. 174 N.W.2d 164 (1969), aff'd, 189 N.W.2d 208 (1971).
51. Id. at 209.
52. Id.at 210.
53. Id.at 210-11.
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Justice Black argued in his dissent that the lower court missed
one major step when it failed to identify whether the operator owed
a legal duty through the application of the inherent risk doctrine
before submitting the case to a jury:
As for the defendant's pleaded affirmative defenses, it may
and should be said that the evidence gave rise to no question
of contributory negligence, and no question of assumption of
risk. Each of these defenses is available-ifat all-when and only
when a submissible case of actionablenegligence has been made
out. No such case was made out here. The action instead is
controlled by an old legal maxim, "volenti non fit injuria"
(he who consents cannot receive an injury),54
Justice Black cited the Kaufman court's decision to dismiss plaintiff's
claim based upon the inherent risk doctrine as applied by the courts
in Murphy and Wright." Black reasoned plaintiff's injuries were a
result of an inherent risk of the sport, and that plaintiff had therefore
failed to establish the existence of a legal duty.56
In Leopold v. Okemo Mountain, 7 plaintiff's decedent was killed
when he hit an unpadded lift tower on the slope. The Vermont Federal Court affirmed its holding in Wright, granting judgment for the
defendant. 58 The court held that the tower was obvious and necessary
and an inherent risk of the sport. 59
However, the court strayed from Wright when it injected an analysis of the elements of the defense of secondary assumption of risk
into the inherent risk doctrine. 60 The court took the "obvious and
necessary" language of Wright and emphasized plaintiff's actual
knowledge and appreciation of the dangers of the unpadded lift towers, and his decision to proceed voluntarily, despite the danger. 6' The
factors the court examined were in fact the elements of the defense
of secondary assumption of risk. 62 Had the court truly dovetailed with
Wright, plaintiff's actual knowledge would not have mattered. 6

54. Id. at 218 (emphasis added.)
55. Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co., 166 N.E. 173, 174 (N.Y. 1929); Wright v.
Mt. Mansfield Lift. Inc., 96 F. Supp. 786 (D. Vt. 1951).
56. Kaufman v. State, 172 N.Y.S.2d 276 (1958).
57. 420 F. Supp. 781 (D.Vt. 1976).
58. Id. at 788.
59. Id. at 787.
60. Id. at 786-87.
61. Id.at 786-787.
62. Id. at 786-88; see also supra notes 32 and 45.
63. In Wright, the snow covered stump was a latent danger. It was irrelevant that plaintiff
had no actual knowledge of the stump. The stump was objectively "obvious" to anyone who
chose to participate in the sport, and therefore qualified as an pbvious and necessary inherent
danger. Wright v. Mt. Mansfield Lift, Inc., 96 F. Supp. 786, 791 (D.Vt. 1951). Accord, Dillworth v. Gambardella, 776 F. Supp. 170 (D. Vt. 1991).
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In the landmark case of Sunday v. Stratton Corp.,64 the Vermont
Supreme Court affirmed a jury verdict awarding $1,500,000 to plaintiff for serious injuries received when he fell on a groomed cat track. 6
The court acknowledged the inherent risk doctrine as articulated in
Murphy/Wright, noting that it involves an analysis of the scope of
the operator's duty in the first instance." The court articulated that
a defendant is not liable for injuries resulting from inherent risks
because the injuries result from something the defendant had no duty
to "extinguish or warn about." 67 However, the court refused to hold
that the snow covered brush before it could be considered an inherent
risk." The court held that Stratton's express representations 69 about
the condition of its slopes expanded its duty to invitees to an obligation to protect plaintiff from the covered brush:
While skiers fall, as a matter of common knowledge, that does
not make every fall a danger inherent in the sport. If the fall
is due to no breach of duty on the part of the defendant, its
risk is assumed in the primary sense, and there can be no
recovery. But where the evidence indicates existence or assumption of duty and its breach, that risk is not one "assumed" by the plaintiff .... 70
Essentially, the court would not allow Stratton to argue that the preshad expressly assumed
ence of brush was an inherent risk where 7it
1
a duty to keep the trails free from brush.
The Sunday decision was viewed by many as the death knell to
the inherent risk doctrine. This view was buttressed by the court's

64. 390 A.2d 398 (Vt. 1978).
65. Id. at 400.
66. Id. at 401-02.
67. Id. at 403.

68. Id. at 402. The court stated:
Nor do we subscribe to the theory that the brush here in question is such an inherent
danger, given defendant's unchallenged testimony, the basis for its whole defense,
that its modem methods of care have made such a growth, within the travelled trail,
impossible.
Id.
69. Id. at 401-403. The court noted that:
At the time of the accident some 52 ski patrolmen were on duty, plus a trail crew
charged with checking for hazards. At least 17 pieces of heavy equipment were available for use, plus other transportation. Prior to 1974, Stratton had widely advertised
its world-wide reputation for trail maintenance, "meticulous grooming" and "top
quality cover."
Id.
70. Id. at 403.
71. Id.at 401-03.
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announcement that "the timorous need no longer stay at home.' '72
Operators were gravely concerned that post-Sunday, they would be
viewed as insurers of safety, thus threatening their continued exis73
tence.
The court's holding in Blair v. Mt. Hood74 further illustrates the
continued confusion surrounding the term assumption of risk when
used in connection with the inherent risk doctrine. In Blair, plaintiff
was injured in a fall while skiing. 7 1 The Oregon Supreme Court struggled with the interpretation of a statute whereby the legislature had
abolished the doctrine of implied assumption of risk.76 The Court
agreed that an instruction on assumption of risk was improper, but
re-affirmed the jury verdict for the operator because of plaintiff's
failure to timely object to the instruction. 7 The court noted that the
legislature had abolished assumption of risk, thereby precluding the
use of the doctrine, either in connection with primary or secondary
assumption of risk. 78 However, the court noted that the concept of
primary assumption of risk (inherent risk doctrine) was still com-79
pletely viable if it were couched in terms of the legal duty owed.
In other words, if plaintiff failed to prove a legal duty owed, there
could be no negligence, and defendant would be relieved of liability. 0
72. Id. at 402. To the contrary, the court acknowledged the validity of the inherent risk
doctrine as espoused in Wright, but simply believed that the snow covered brush before it
could not be viewed as an inherent risk. The court thus went on to affirm the jury verdict,
finding that Stratton had breached its duty to invitees by failing to warn about or remove the
brush, which breach was the proximate cause of the injuries. Id. at 401-03. Probably because
of the severity of the injuries (quadriplegia) and the large damage award, many misunderstood
the court's decision as rejecting the Wright inherent risk doctrine. See Farrow, supra note 8
at 270, n.76, infra note 110. See supra note 8 for reaction to Sunday.
73. See supra note 8.
74. 630 P.2d 827 (Or. 1981); reh. den., modified, 634 P.2d 241 (Or. 1981).
75. Plaintiff fell when he chose to return to the base lodge by way of a run he had
never skied. He failed to see a sharp curve in the run and skied directly into a creek ravine.
Id. at 828.
76. OR. RaV. STAT. § 18-475 (2) provided: "The doctrine of implied assumption of risk
is abolished." Blair, 630 P.2d at 829.
77. Id. at 833. The jury had returned a verdict for operator and the court of appeals
had reversed based on jury instruction error. Id. at 829.
78. The court stated:
We conclude that in flatly abolishing the "doctrine of implied assumption of risk"
the legislature intended to abolish all use of the concept of plaintiff's assumption
of risk in. negligence cases (other than in its "express" sense) whether as a defense
to defendant's prior "tortious" conduct or as a shorthand phrase for defendant's
lack of duty under the circumstances or breach of duty.
Id. at 831.
79. Id. at 832.
80. Probably because of this incredible confusion, the Oregon legislature later enacted
a ski statute which expressly recognized the inherent risk doctrine. OR. REV. STAT. § 30.970
to 990 (1991). OR. REv. STAT. § 30.975 provides:
In accordance with ORS 18.470 [regarding contributory negligence] and notwithstanding ORS 18.475(2) [abolishing the doctrine of implied assumption of risk], an
individual who engages in the sport of skiing, alpine or nordic, accepts and assumes
the inherent risks of skiing insofar as they are reasonably obvious, expected or necessary.
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Later, in Smith v. Seven Springs,"' the third circuit affirmed a
summary judgment for the ski area operator. s2 In Smith, plaintiff
was injured when he fell on an icy slope.83 The court was asked to
determine whether the comparative fault statute (which abolished the
defense of assumption of risk) contemplated the continued viability
of the primary assumption of risk (inherent risk) doctrine s4 in downhill skiing cases. 85 The court determined that the statute was meant
to preserve the inherent risk doctrine, but throughout the opinion,
referred to the doctrine as a "defense," even though the court identified that the "defense" involved a duty analysis.s 6
The court identified that the operator owed certain duties to his
invitees, but stopped there with its duty analysis.'" The court then
analyzed the inherent risk doctrine like a defense, determining not
whether the pole condition constituted an inherent risk, but whether
plaintiff had known and appreciated the danger, and voluntarily consented to it. 88 The court then held that plaintiff's assumption of risk
relieved the operator of any duty of care (even had the operator been
negligent).8 9 Although the court called it a primary assumption of risk
analysis, the court had in fact applied secondary assumption of risk
analysis. 90

81. 716 F.2d 1002 (3d Cir. 1983).
82. Id. at 1009.
83. After falling on the slope, the plaintiff collided with a telephone like pole and some
snow-making pipes. Id. at 1005.
84. In Smith, the court referred to the "inherent risk doctrine" as the "primary assumption of risk" doctrine. As stated supra, the authors have avoided using the term "assumption of risk," where appropriate, to avoid confusion.
85. Id. at 1006. Pennsylvania's comparative negligence statute contained (and still contains) a section which preserves the primary assumption of risk doctrine in downhill skiing
cases:
(c) Downhill Skiing.(1) The General Assembly finds that the sport of downhill skiing is practiced by a
large number of citizens of this Commonwealth and also attracts to this Commonwealth large numbers of nonresidents significantly contributing to the economy of
this Commonwealth. It is recognized that as in some other sports, there are inherent
risks in the sport of downhill skiing.
(2) The doctrine of voluntary assumption of risk as it applies to downhill skiing
injuries and damages is not modified by subsections (a) and (b).
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 42 § 7102(c) (1982).

86. Smith, 716 F.2d at 1005-09.
87. Id. at 1009.
88. Id. at 1005, 1007-09.
89. Id. at 1009.
90. The court should have determined, as a matter of law, whether the injuries resulted
from an inherent risk. If so, the operator had no duty to plaintiff, and plaintiff's cause of
action must fail. If not, the court could determine if the operator had breached its duty and
correspondingly, if plaintiff had assumed the risk in a secondary sense. At that point, defendant
would have the burden to prove plaintiff's contributory negligence, e.g., his knowledge, appreciation and consent. If he succeeded, the court could have then utilized the comparative
fault statute to compare the fault of the parties accordingly.
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Enactment of Comparative Negligence Laws

Comparative negligence laws contributed to the continued confusion between the inherent risk doctrine and secondary assumption
of risk. 9' In most states, following enactment of comparative negligence laws, assumption of risk was merged into c6ntributory negligence. Neither defense continued as an absolute bar to a negligence
cause of action.9 If the plaintiff proved his prima facie case, the
defenses were only available to assign plaintiff
with a share of the
93
fault and so reduce his ultimate recovery.
It became critical to distinguish between the inherent risk "duty"
analysis, and the defense of secondary assumption of risk (contributory negligence). Despite the distinction, some courts ruled that the
doctrine of assumption of risk, whether primary (inherent risk) or
secondary, had no place in the law with the advent of comparative
negligence principles.94 This was done despite the fact that inherent
risk duty analysis precedes the application of comparative negligence
principles; if an injury is the result of an inherent risk, defendant
owes no legal duty and cannot be found negligent, hence, there is
no negligence to compare. 95 It was abundantly clear that the inaccurate use of the term "assumption of risk" to describe the inherent
risk doctrine had launched the doctrine into even more troubled waters. 96

91. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
92. Keeton et al., supra note 5, § 68 at 496. See also supra note 33 and accompanying
text.
93. Id.
94. Keeton et al., supra note 5. See, e.g. Rosen v. LTV Recreation Development, Inc.,
569 F.2d 1117, 1121 (10th Cir. 1978) (Tenth Circuit held that because the Supreme Court of
Colorado had merged assumption of risk into contributory negligence following adoption of
comparative negligence laws, primary assumption of risk (inherent risk) doctrine could not be
used to absolve operator of liability. The court failed to identify the inherent risk doctrine as
a duty analysis and simply held that the elements of an assumption of risk defense-knowledge
and consent-would be weighed in determining plaintiff's potential comparative fault.) In essence, the court skipped over the inherent risk duty analysis and presumed a duty on the part
of the operator.
95. Keeton et al., supra note 5. In Dillworth, the Vermont Federal Court, citing Sunday
held:
... any chance of conflict between a comparative negligence statute and the defense
of primary assumption of the risk as an absolute bar to recovery becomes nonexistent. When a primary assumption of the risk exists there is no liability to the
plaintiff because there is no negligence on the part of the defendant to begin with;
the danger to the plaintiff is not one which the defendant is required to extinguish
or warn about. Having no duty to begin with, there is no breach of duty to constitute
negligence.
Dillworth v. Gambardella, 776 F. Supp. 170, 173 (D. Vt. 1991). Accord, Clover v. Snowbird
Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037, 1046 (Utah 1991); Smith v. Seven Springs Farm, Inc., 716 F.2d,
1002, 1008 (3d. Cir. 1983).
96. See, Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., 155 A.2d 90, 93 (N.J. 1959). See
also, Smissen, supra note 45, § 5.22 at 235-36.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol28/iss1/4

16

Hansen and Duerr: Recreation Injuries & (and) Inherent Risks: Wyoming's Recreation

1993
E.

RECREATION SAFETY ACT
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The Wyoming Supreme Court has never had an opportunity to
analyze the inherent risk doctrine. However, the court has had ample
opportunity to rule upon the scope of the obvious danger rule, a
primary assumption of risk doctrine quite similar to the inherent risk
doctrine.Y
The court's varied and inconsistent analysis of the obvious danger rule sheds light on the equal historical confusion in Wyoming
surrounding primary assumption of risk concepts. 9
Historically in Wyoming, a possessor of land had no duty to his
invitee to protect him from reasonably known, discoverable or obvious dangers on the premises. 99 If plaintiff's injuries were caused by
such dangers, the defendant owed no duty, and was therefore absolved of liability100 However, throughout the years, the Wyoming
Supreme Court has analyzed the obvious danger rule inconsistentlyboth as a duty limitation [primary assumption of risk] and as a form
of contributory negligence [secondary assumption of risk.]' 0'
In Sherman v. Platte County,102 the Wyoming Supreme Court
held that because the obvious danger rule operated to limit a pos-

97. See cases cited in: Lisa A. Yerkovich, Torts-The Obvious Danger Rule-A Qualified
Adoption of Secondary Assumption of Risk Analysis. O'Donnell v. City of Casper, 696 P.2d
1278 (Wyo. 1985), 21 LAND & WATER L. REv. 251 (1985) [hereinafter Yerkovich]; Barbara L.
Lauer, Torts-Assumption of Risk and the Obvious Danger Rule. Primary or Secondary Assumption of Risk? Sherman v. Platte County, 642 P.2d 787 (Wyo. 1982), 18 LAND & WATER
L. Rav. 373 (1982) [hereinafter Lauer).
Note that the obvious danger rule only operates to limit a possessor's duty in the premises
liability context. Cervelli v. Graves, 661 P.2d 1032, 1039 (Wyo. 1983). In contrast, the inherent
risk doctrine can apply outside the premises liability context in cases involving activities such
as climbing and rafting (recreational provider not "possessor" of land). See also infra note
144. For a discussion of the Act's interaction with Wyoming premises liability law and the
Wyoming Recreational Use Statute, see infra notes 183-210 and accompanying text.
98. See also O'Donnell v. City of Casper, 696 P.2d 1278, 1288 (Wyo. 1985). Authors
Lauer and Yerkovich advocate the complete abrogation of the obvious danger "duty" limitation
in favor of a fault comparison in all cases. See Lauer and Yerkovich, supra note 97.
99. Sherman v. Platte County, 642 P.2d 787, 790 (Wyo. 1982). See also supra note 26
for a discussion of the duties owed to licensees and trespassers.
100. Id. (Compare the inherent risk doctrine: if plaintiff's injuries are the result of an
inherent risk of the sport, the defendant owes no duty, is not negligent, and is therefore absolved
of liability.) In Sherman, the Wyoming Supreme Court cited two rules: the no duty/obvious
danger rule and the no duty/natural accumulations of ice and snow rule. The court held that
the latter rule expanded the scope of protection given the occupier under the former rule. Id.
at 789.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343A, cmt. c (1965) discusses "inherent" dangers:
§ 343A. Known or Obvious Dangers.
The possessor's activities may involve a risk which is known or obvious to those
who enter his land, either because the risk is inherent in the nature of the activity
itself, or because they are aware that it is carried on in a manner which involves
risks that are not necessarily inherent in such activities.
101. O'Donnell, 696 P.2d at 1281-82.
102. 642 P.2d 787 (Wyo. 1982).
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sessor's duty [primary assumption of risk analysis], it remained unaffected by Wyoming's comparative negligence act. 03 However, in
O'Donnell v. City of Casper, the court held that the duty limitation
of the obvious danger rule was not consistent with comparative negligence principles.'1 The court proceeded to narrow the obvious danger rule to limit the possessor's duty only in cases involving natural
conditions. 05 The court thus expanded the scope of a possessor's
duty, holding that the obviousness of the danger arising from an
artificial or man-made condition must only be viewed as a factor in
assessing the plaintiff's potential contributory fault.'06
In a strong dissent, Justice Rooney urged that the majority:
[wiould dissect negligence by removing one of its essential
elements and then treat the remaining elements as a viable
whole in comparing them with the dissected element. Negligence consists of a duty, a violation of the duty, proximately
causing the injury. (Cites omitted). The majority opinion sets
"duty" off from "negligence" and then discusses the presence, or absence, of "negligence" without one of its component parts.e7
Justice Rooney noted the majority opinion incorrectly confused the
application of contributory negligence which "necessarily presupposes" the presence of defendant's negligence, with the application

103. Id. at 790. The court held:
Comparative negligence only abrogated absolute defenses involving the plaintiff's own
negligence in bringing about his or her injuries. See Brittain v. Booth, 601 P.2d 532
(Wyo. 1979). However, it did not impose any new duties of care on prospective
defendants. Since the law of this state is to the effect that there is no duty to remove
or warn of an obvious danger or one that is known to plaintiff, no change was
accomplished in that law by the adoption of comparative negligence. (emphasis added).
104. 696 P.2d 1278, 1281-83 (Wyo. 1985). The court failed to distinguish the obvious
danger rule as a primary assumption of risk "duty" analysis and instead lumped it with secondary assumption of risk. Primary assumption of risk is not inconsistent with comparative
fault principles (supra note 95 and accompanying text). Precisely because the defense of [secondary] assumption of risk is inconsistent with comparative fault principles, it has been merged
into contributory negligence for purposes of comparing fault under the Comparative Negligence
Act. Neither doctrine survives as a complete defense to a negligence action. Brittain, 601 P.2d
at 534. Indeed, Wyoming recommends no jury instruction on the defense of assumption of
risk. Wyo. Pattern Jury Instructions, § 3.07 (September 1981).
105. O'Donnell, 696 P.2d at 1283. The holding in O'Donnell has been affirmed; see e.g.,
Stephenson v. Pacific Power & Light Co., 779 P.2d 1169, 1179 (Wyo. 1989); Radosevich v.
Board of County Commissioners, 776 P.2d 747, 749 (Wyo. 1989). Although the court's holdings
in Stephenson and Radosevich refer only to invitees, it appears that the obvious danger rule
also applies to licensees. See Allen v. Slim Pickens Enterprises, 777 P.2d 79, 82 (Wyo. 1989).
106. O'Donnell, 696 P.2d at 1281-82. Note that a different body of law applies to "attractive nuisances," a doctrine which delineates a possessor's duty to children in the context
of artificial conditions. See Thomas v. South Cheyenne Water and Sewer District, 702 P.2d
1303, 1305 (Wyo. 1985), citing with approval RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 339 (1965).
107. O'Donnell, 696 P.2d at 1288.
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of the obvious danger rule, which is focused on defendant's lack of
a legal duty-" s Justice Rooney concluded that the application of the
obvious danger rule or, the analysis of whether a legal duty exists,
is a question of law for the court. He noted that the majority largely
ignored this issue in its opinion. °9
The Wyoming Supreme Court's ruling in O'Donnell, holding intact only a portion of the obvious danger rule, certainly left the viability of other primary assumption of risk doctrines, like the inherent
risk doctrine, very unclear.
F.

Call for Protective Legislation

The Sunday decision sent a shock wave through the entire ski
industry. It appeared that the inherent risk doctrine was in tatters," 0
leaving the ski industry reeling over the thought of skyrocketing insurance rates, potential uninsurability and ever increasing liability.",
In Wyoming and other western states, the concern was multiplied,
because recreation was quickly becoming a critical segment of economies 2suffering from downturns in the energy and ranching industries."1
Unfortunately, many misinterpreted the Sunday decision as limiting or killing the inherent risk doctrine as framed in Wright and
Murphy.' Surely contributing to this misunderstanding was the historical confusion and resulting misapplication of the inherent risk
doctrine by courts throughout the country. In any event, the ski industry and state legislatures reacted quickly to this perceived 180 degree change in the courts' analysis, scrambling to adopt protective
legislation which would preserve the inherent risk doctrine as enun4
ciated in Wright."

G.

Legislative Enactments

Legislatures across the country enacted a variety of legislation
in an attempt to allocate the responsibilities between recreational

108. Id. at 1290.
109. Id. at 1289-90.
110. In reality, Sunday acknowledged the viability of the inherent risk doctrine, but simply
chose not to apply it to the facts of the case. Sunday v. Stratton Corp., 390 A.2d 398 (Vt.
1978). See supra note 72.
111. Reasons for the premium increases, coverage decreases and unavailability of insurance
include: (1) investment decisions by insurance companies during the double digit interest periods
of the late 1970's; (2) lack of competition; and (3) the cost of frivolous suits. See e.g. supra,
note 8.
112. See supra note 10.
113. See supra note 72.
114. See supra note 9.
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providers and participants. Twenty-six jurisdictions currently have this

type of legislation in place."' Many states' legislation also contain6
abbreviated notice of claim and statute of limitations provisions."
Colorado's statute appears unique in providing for a cap on plaintiff's
recoverable damages."'
Two different approaches have been taken. Under the first approach, the legislature defines the legal duty and the scope of inherent
risks, or both, and the trier of fact decides factual issues. This will
be referred to as the "legislative approach." Under the second approach, the judge determines the legal duty and scope of inherent

risks and the trier of fact decides factual issues. This will be referred
to as the "judicial approach."
Only the Wyoming, Vermont and Pennsylvania statutes follow

a true judicial approach."' The remaining twenty-three states in some
way attempt to define the respective duties of operator or participant,
the scope of inherent risks, or all three. 19 The Maine, Massachusetts
and Washington statutes, though defining operator/participant duties

to some degree, do not define inherent risks. 2 Wyoming, Vermont
and Wisconsin are the only jurisdictions whose acts cover all rec-

reational sports

121

115. Id. See Arthur N. Frakr and Janna S. Raukin, Surveying the Slippery Slope: The
Questionable Value of Legislation to Limit Ski Area Liability, 28 IDAxio L. REv. 227 (199192), for a discussion of inherent risk legislation in the ski context. Authors Frakr and Raukin
take a dim view of the efficacy of this type of legislation.
116. See supra note 9. Colorado: 2-year statute of limitations, § 33-44-111; Maine: 2-year
statute of limitations, 14 § 752B; Massachusetts: 90 day notice of claim with limited grace
period, 1-year statute of limitations, § 71P; New Hampshire: 90-day notice of claim, 2-year
statute of limitations, § A25; Oregon: 180-day notice of claim with limited grace period, 2year statute of limitations, § 30.980(1) & (3); Tennessee: 90-day notice of claim, I-year statute
of limitations, § 68-48-107(c).
117. COLO. REv. SrAT. ANN. § 33-44-113 (Supp. 1991) provides as follows:
The total amount of damages which may be recovered from a ski area operator by
a skier who uses a ski area for the purpose of skiing or for the purpose of sliding
downhill on snow or ice on skis, a toboggan, a sled, a tube, a ski-bob, a snow board,
or any other device and who is injured, excluding those associated with an injury
occurring to a passenger while riding on a passenger tramway, shall not exceed one
million dollars, present value, including any derivative claim by any other claimant,
which shall not exceed two hundred fifty thousand dollars, present value, and including any claim attributable to non-economic loss or injury, as defined in sections
13-21-102.5 (2) (a) and (2) (b), C.R.S., whether past damages, future damages, or
a combination of both, which shall not exceed two hundred fifty thousand dollars.
The statute goes on to provide an exception, allowing damages in excess of the cap in limited
circumstances.
118. Wyo. STAT. §§ 1-1-121, -123 (Supp. 1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1037 (1973 &
Supp. 1991); PA. CoNs. STAT. ANr. 42 § 7102 (1982 & Supp. 1992).
119. See supra note 9; See infra appendix A.
120. See supra note 9. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26 § 488; MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 143 §
71N; WAm. ReLv. CODE ANN. § 70.117.024(6). The statutes of Nevada, North Carolina, Rhode
Island and Tennessee, although skier safety acts; do not mention the term "inherent risk."
Id. at note 119.
121. See supra note 9. WYO. STAT. § l-l-122(a)(iii); VT. STAT. ANN. LAWS. tit. 12 § 1037;
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Following this wave of legislative activity, constitutional attacks
1 "
were launched on some state statutes. In Brewer v. Ski Lift, Inc., 2
the Montana Supreme Court reversed a summary judgment for the
ski area operator when it struck down portions of the Montana skier
responsibility statute on equal protectioh grounds. Although the court
appreciated the economic interest in limiting liability for Montana's
ski industry, it could find no rational basis for broad statutory language which 1) essentially eliminated actions against the operator for
operator negligence, 23 and, 2) singled out skiers for exemption from
the comparative negligence act, even in cases of potential operator
negligence. 124

WIs. STAT. § 895.525(2). Wisconsin, the first state to enact comparative negligence laws, takes
a quite unique approach: a participant's assumption of inherent risks goes directly to his contributory fault for comparative fault purposes. Thus, the provider's duty re: inherent risks is
entirely presumed. Wis. STAT. § 895.525(3).
In addition to equal protection concerns, the obvious preference for a recreation act versus
a skiing act is quite apparent from the patchwork approach taken by many state legislatures.
See, e.g. Maine hang gliding "inherent risk" statute, ME. RFv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 489-A;
Idaho outfitters and guides "inherent risk" statute, IDAHO CODE § 6-1201. Opposition is stiff

to attempted introduction of a bill in the Colorado legislature providing similar protection to
the river rafting industry; see Tort Reform Test, WALL ST. JRNL., March 1992.
Of course, the judicial approach taken in Wyoming and Vermont is, for all practical
purposes, imperative, because those statutes cover an undefinable group of recreational activities. It would be impossible to thoroughly list out inherent risks and duties for the non-exclusive
group of recreational activities covered by those statutes. WYo. STAT. § 1-1-122(a)(iii) (Supp.
1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 1037. See infra note 240 and accompanying text.
122. 762 P.2d 226 (Mont. 1988).
123. MONT. CODE ANN. § 23-2-736 (1991) states "a skier assumes the risk and all legal
responsibility for injury to himself or loss of property that results from participating in the
sport of skiing by virtue of his participation." (Emphasis added.) The court also struck down
the following provision on similar grounds: "the responsibility for collisions with a person or
object while skiing is the responsibility of the person or persons and not the responsibility of
the ski area operator." The court held that these sections essentially eliminated any proximate
cause requirement, thereby precluding recovery against an operator for injuries caused by operator negligence. Brewer, 762 P.2d at 230. The latter section has now been deleted from the
act, and the former section revised to require proximate cause and to clearly delineate an
operator's duties.
Note: both Tennessee and Idaho currently include broad "participation" language in their
statutes and may therefore be subject to constitutional attack on grounds similar to those stated
in Brewer. See, IDAHO CODE § 6-1106 (1992); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-48-103 (1992); however,
similar statutory language withstood an equal protection challenge in Lewis v. Canaan Valley
Resorts, Inc. 408 S.E.2d 634 (W.Va. 1991). In that case, the West Virginia Supreme Court
found that, unlike the Montana statute cited in Brewer, the West Virginia statute delineated
certain operator duties, and thereby did not eliminate actions against the operator for operator
negligence. Id. at 642-43.
124. MONT. CODE ANN. § 23-2-737 (1991) provided that: "Notwithstanding any comparative negligence law in this state, a person is barred from recovery from a ski area operator
for loss or damage resulting from any risk inherent in the sport of skiing ...." The court
held that the statute singled out skiers, to the exclusion of other inherent risk sports, for
exemption from application of the comparative negligence laws. Brewer, 762 P.2d at 731.
If the entire act had been more carefully drafted to preserve actions against operators for
operator negligence, this section should have appropriately triggered the notion that comparative
negligence laws do not conflict with the inherent risk doctrine; if an inherent risk caused the
injury, there is no operator duty and no negligence to compare. See supra note 5. However,
because other sections of the act eliminated actions for operator negligence, this section had
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On the other hand, courts have generally upheld a legislative
decision to single out skiers, to the exclusion of all inherent risk
sports, for statutory coverage. 25 Indeed, the majority of states' inherent risk legislation covers only skiing. 26 In Pizza v. Wolf Creek
Ski Development Corp.,127 the Colorado Supreme Court noted the
well established rule that classes may be treated differently, provided
there is a reasonable basis for the differing treatment. The court held
that the ski industry, as an important segment of the state's economy,
provided that reasonable basis.lu
III.
A.

THE WYOMNUm

ACT

Legislative History

In 1989, the Wyoming legislature passed Wyoming's Recreational
Safety Act (the "Act"). The engine driving passage of the Act was
the Wyoming ski industry, represented by its statewide association,
Ski Wyoming, Inc. 29 The Act altered versions unsuccessfully presented in the two previous legislative sessions. 30 The impetus behind
the revised Act was an attempt to introduce principles perceived as
beneficial to the growing Wyoming recreation industry while avoiding
potential constitutional conflict. 3 ' Wyoming legislators hoped that the

a different effect. On the other hand, the court, like the court in Rosen, may have misinterpreted
the inherent risk doctrine as being a secondary, rather than a primary assumption of risk
concept. See supra note 5.
125. See infra note 127 and accompanying text.
126. See supra note 9.
127. 711 P.2d 671 (Colo. 1985).
128. Id. at 679; see also Northcutt v. Sun Valley Co., 787 P.2d 1159, 1165-66 (Idaho
1990); Lewis v. Canaan Valley Resorts, 408 SE.2d 634, 643 (W.Va. 1991) ("ski" statutes upheld
on same grounds).
129. Ski Wyoming was organized in 1989. Ten ski areas were, and currently are, members:
Antelope Butte - Dayton; Eagle Rock - Evanston; Grand Targhee -Alta; High Park - Worland;
Hogadon - Casper; Jackson Hole Ski Resort -Teton Village; Pine Creek - Cokeville; Sleeping
Giant - Cody; Snow King - Jackson and Snowy Range - Laramie.
130. In 1987 the "Skier Assumption of Risk" bill passed the Wyoming Senate and failed
to get out of committee in the House (SF 0280-1987). In 1988 the "Wyoming Ski Safety Act"
failed to get the necessary two thirds vote of the legislative members to gain introduction to
the semiannual budgeting session (SF14, 1988). Each bill was based on a Montana model and
proposed to create Wyoming Statute §§ 1-43-101 through 107. The bills were specific to the
ski industry and would have defined the responsibilities of skiers and ski area operators, barred
recovery by a skier against a ski area operator where the skier is deemed to assume defined
risks, limited damages, and reduced the statute of limitations to two years. These bills followed
the Colorado type legislation, specifically defining duty. The Wyoming legislature avoided the
pitfalls of the Montana statute and did not adopt the bill based on the Montana model. See
supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text (portions of Montana model held unconstitutional).
In 1989 the legislation was renamed "The Recreation Safety Act," broadening the act to cover
the entire recreation and tourism industry, including affected branches of the government.
131. Id. The legislative intent is clearly set forth in the purpose clause contained in the
original draft of the 1989 law. This clause stated:
1-1-121(b) Legislative Purpose: The legislature finds that sport and recreation opportunities, activities, or services are participated in by a large number of residents

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol28/iss1/4

22

Hansen and Duerr: Recreation Injuries & (and) Inherent Risks: Wyoming's Recreation

1993

RECREATION SAFETY ACT

Act would, in time, increase the availability of insurance to recreation
providers, thereby3 2enhancing the recreational opportunities for tourists in Wyoming.
B.

General Scope of Act
The Act provides as follows:

1-1-121 RECREATION SAFETY ACT; short title.
1-1-122 Definitions.
(a) As used in this act:
(i)

"Inherent risk" means any risk that is characteristic

of or intrinsic to any sport or recreational opportunity and
which cannot reasonably be eliminated, altered, or controlled;
(ii) "Provider" means any person or governmental entity
which for profit or otherwise, offers or conducts a sport
or recreational opportunity. This act does not apply to a
cause of action based upon the design or manufacture of
sport or recreational equipment or products or safety
equipment used incidental to or required by the sport or
recreational opportunity;
(iii) "Sport or recreational opportunity" means commonly understood sporting activities including baseball,
softball, football, soccer, basketball, swimming, hockey,

of Wyoming and attract a large number of nonresidents, significantly contributing
to tourism and the economy of this State. It further finds that few insurance carriers
are willing to provide liability insurance protection to many providers of sport and
recreational opportunities, activities, and services and that the premiums charged by
those carriers have risen sharply in recent years due to litigation and to confusion
as to whether participants are responsible for the risks inherent in the sport or recreational opportunities, activities, and services. Therefore, it is the purpose of this
act, to clarify the law in relation to sport and recreational injuries and the risks
inherent in these sport and recreational opportunities, activities, and services, to establish as a matter of law that certain risks are inherent in such sport and recreational
opportunities, activities, and services and to provide that, as a matter of public policy.
no person engaged in that sport or recreational opportunity, activity, or service shall
recover from the owner, operator, or provider of such sport or recreational opportunity, activities or services for injuries, damages or death resulting from those inherent risks. (Emphasis added).
The House Travel and Recreation Committee failed to pass that version of the bill out of
committee by a vote of I to 8. On introduction to the Senate Recreation Committee the purpose
clause was dropped for simplification and brevity. With other changes, the bill passed the
Senate Committee 5-0 and the full Senate 27-2. On return to the House Recreation Committee
the bill passed 7 to 1 and went on to passage by the full House and was signed by the Governor.
132. See supra note 8.
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dude ranching, nordic or alpine skiing, mountain climbing, river floating, hunting, fishing, backcountry strips,
horseback riding, snowmobiling and similar recreational
opportunities;

(iv) "This act" means W.S. 1-1-121 through 1-1-123. (Laws
1989), (ch. 228, 1.)
1-1-123 ASSUMPTION OF RISK
(a) Any person who takes part in any sport or recreational
opportunity assumes the inherent risk of injury and all legal
responsibility for damage, injury, or death to himself or other
persons or property that results from the inherent risks in that
sport or recreational opportunity.
(b) A provider of any sport or recreational opportunity is not
required to eliminate, alter or control the inherent risks within

the particular sport or recreational opportunity.
(c) Actions based upon negligence of the provider not caused
by an inherent risk of the sport or recreational opportunity
shall be preserved
pursuant to W.S. 1-1-109. (Laws 1989, ch.
33
228, 1) (13).
The entire Act consists of only seven paragraphs and includes
the definition of only three terms: provider, sport or recreational
activity and inherent risk. It thus stands in stark contrast to other
states' lengthy definitions of duties and inherent risks.'3 Instead the
Act places the responsibility on the judiciary to determine the existence of a legal duty owed by the operator to the participant.'3 5 The
Act, along with the statutes of Vermont and36Wisconsin, is in a minority in applying to all recriational sports.
The key to the Act is that it codifies 37 the common law principles
set out in Wright and Murphy. The court is forced to undertake the

133. WYo. STAT. 1-1-121, -123 (SuP'. 1991).
134. See supra note 119; See infra note 240 and accompanying text. (discussing why the
judicial approach taken in the Wyoming Act is necessary in light of its coverage of all recreational activities.)
135. Wyoming used the statutes of Vermont and Utah as models for this approach. Utah
has since expanded its skiing statute to include certain defined operator duties, leaning now
towards the legislative approach. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-27-51,-54 (1992).
136. See supra note 121. Applying the inherent risk doctrine to all recreational sports is
consistent with the common law as espoused in Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co., 166
N.E. 173 (N.Y. 1929) and Wright v. Mt. Mansfield Lift, Inc. 96 F.Supp. 786 (D.Vt. 1951).
See supra note 2.
137. In precisely codifying the inherent risk doctrine, the Act does not resurrect assumption
of risk as a complete defense to a negligence action. See supra note 2 and notes 31-40 and
accompanying text. The constitutionality of the Act should therefore not be thrown into ques-

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol28/iss1/4

24

Hansen and Duerr: Recreation Injuries & (and) Inherent Risks: Wyoming's Recreation

1993

RECREATION SAFETY ACT

duty analysis required by the inherent risk doctrine, rather than con-

fusing the doctrine with secondary assumption of risk or contributory
negligence. 38 Furthermore, by placing the duty analysis in the hands
of the judiciary, the Act differs markedly from the legislative approach taken in other states, like Colorado, wherein legislatures have
exclusively
defined an operator's duties and the scope of inherent
39
risks.
IV.

ANALYSIS OF ACT, PRACTICAL USE AND PROPOSED ANALYTICAL

FRAMEwORK
A.

Analysis of Act

The original purpose clause states that the Act was intended to
eliminate "confusion," "clarify the law" in relation to the inherent
risk doctrine, and codify that "as a matter of law ... certain risks
are inherent in recreational activities."'14 0 The Act does just this in
allowing the court to determine, as a matter of law, if the provider

tion by the Wyoming Supreme Court's recent decision in Mills v. Niggemyer. 837 P.2d 48
(Wyo. 1992). In that case, a plurality of Justices held that a provision of the Worker's Compensation Act granting full immunity from liability to co-employees was unconstitutional under
the equal protection provisions of the Wyoming Constitution. Justices Macy & Urbigkit held
that Wyo. SrAT.. § 27-14-104 (1992) affected a fundamental right-the employees' right of
access to the courts under Wyo. CONsT. ART. 1, § 8-and therefore was subject to a strict
scrutiny analysis. Applying that analysis, the court could find no compelling reason for a
provision which granted co-employees, to the exclusion of other classes, complete immunity
from suit, thus impinging upon an injured parties' right of meaningful access to the courts.
Justice Cardine specially concurred, but argued on other grounds that the provision was unconstitutional in that it limited the amount of a party's recoverable damages. Wyo. CoNsT.
ART. X, § 4). Cardine reasoned that legislation eliminating a tort cause of action against coemployees essentially eliminated the right to recover damages, and thus violated Wyo. CoNsT.
art. X, § 4's plain terms.
In any event, Wyoming's Recreation Safety Act should survive constitutional attack on
either ground. Because the Act is a codification of the inherent risk doctrine set forth in Murphy
v. Steeplechase Amusement Co., 166 N.E. 173 (N.Y. 1929); and Wright v. Mt. Mansfield Lift,
96 F.Supp. 786 (D.Vt. 1951), it does not single out a group for special protection (thus restricting a right of access to the courts), nor does it eliminate a previously existing cause of
action.
138. The Act preserves the inherent risk doctrine as a primary assumption of risk concept:
a limitation on the scope of the operator's duty. In this way, the inherent risk doctrine will
avoid the inconsistent judicial treatment accorded to a similar primary assumption of risk
doctrine: the obvious danger rule. Without the statute, the inherent risk doctrine might suffer
the same fate as the obvious danger rule, being gradually pared down as a duty limitation.
See also, supra, notes 97-109 and accompanying text.
139. CoLo. REv. STAT. §§ 33-44-101,-414 (Supp. 1991). The Colorado statute contains
thirteen sections (approximately twelve pages including latest supplement) covering the respective
duties, a cap on recoverable damages, and abbreviated notice of claim and statute of limitations
provisions. For a recent analysis of the Colorado statutory framework, see Ferguson, supra
note 2 at 175-83. Compare Wyoming's one page Act, supra note 133 and accompanying text.
140. See original purpose clause, supra note 131.
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owes a duty.' 4 ' This duty determination is a two step analysis: was
the injury the result of a risk which is 1) intrinsic to the sport, and
2) one which cannot be reasonably altered, eliminated or controlled. 4 2
If the answer is yes, the risk is inherent. The provider therefore owes
no legal duty and plaintiff cannot maintain a cause of action sounding

in negligence. 4 1 If the answer is no, the risk is not inherent and
plaintiff may go on to prove that the provider's breach of a legal
duty'"4 caused or contributed to his injury.14S

141. What would be the affect of an exculpatory clause, post-Act? In Milligan v. Big
Valley Corp., the Wyoming Supreme Court upheld the validity of a release, signed by plaintiff's
decedent. 754 P.2d 1063 (Wyo. 1988). Plaintiff's decedent was killed in an amateur ski race
called the "Ironman Decathlon" at Grand Targhee Ski Resort in Alta, Wyoming. Plaintiff's
decedent had signed a broad release in favor of defendant, releasing defendant from all liability,
including, the court determined, injuries resulting from defendant's own negligence. The court
held that the release did not violate public policy nor did it find the presence of willful and
wanton misconduct to warrant voiding the release. Id. at 1065-68. Accord, Schutkowski v.
Carey, 725 P.2d 1057 (Wyo. 1986). Both of these cases were decided prior to the enactment
of Wyoming's Act.
Courts interpreting exculpatory clauses in light of existing legislation have come to varying
conclusions. In Phillips v. Monarch Recreation Corp., plaintiff skier was injured when he
collided with trail grooming equipment at defendant's ski area. 668 P.2d 982 (Colo. App. 1983)
The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision not to enforce release
language on the back of defendant's lift ticket, as such language was contrary to the provisions
of Colorado's Ski Safety Act. The court held:
Statutory provisions may not be modified by private agreement if doing so would
violate the public policy expressed in the statute. (cites omitted). The statutes at issue
here allocate the parties' respective duties with regard to the safety of those around
them, and the trial court correctly excluded a purported agreement intended to alter
those duties.
Id. at 987.
However, in Fullick v. Breckenridge Ski Corporation, No. 90-1377, 1992 WL 95421 (10th
Cir. Colo. April 29, 1992) (unpublished disposition), plaintiff skier was injured in a speed
skiing competition at defendant's ski area. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court's grant
of summary judgment in favor of defendant on the basis of a release signed by plaintiff prior
to the race. Although the exculpatory language released Breckenridge from injuries resulting
from its own negligence, the court held that the release was valid. The court noted Phillips,
but held that the release did not "[a]void nor modif[y] any statutory duty found in the Ski
Safety Act. If one could never release liability to a greater degree than a release provided in
a statute, then one would never need to draft a release, in any context." 668 P.2d at 987.
See also, Kotovsky v. Ski Liberty Operating Corporation, 603 A.2d 663, 665 (Pa. 1992)
(Superior Court of Pennsylvania upheld lower court's entry of judgment for defendant on basis
of release; court held that release entered into between private parties (ski racer and ski area)
did not violate public policy as expressed in Pennsylvania ski statute); Collins v. Schweitzer,
Inc., 774 F. Supp. 1253, 1262 (D.Idaho. 1991) (Idaho District Court granted judgment for
defendant ski area based partially on the ski statute and partially on a release signed by plaintiff
ski racer; release only invalid if it purports to absolve ski area of one of its "public duties"
as outlined in statute.)
142. See supra note 133 and accompanying text. Wyo. STAT. § 1-1-122(a)(i) (Supp. 1992).
143. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.. WYo. STAT. § 1-1-123(b) (Supp. 1992).
Plaintiff has the burden of proving the elements of his prima facie case: duty, breach of duty,
proximate cause and damages. McLaughlin v. Michelin Tire Corp., 778 P.2d 59, 63 (Wyo.
1989). If he fails to establish the existence of a duty, he is missing one of the elements of his
prima facie case. See also supra note 31 and accompanying text.
144. WYo. STAT. § 1-1-122(a)(i), may be construed to require the provider to reasonably
alter, eliminate or control non-inherent risks. Wyo. STAT. § 1-1-122(a)(i) (Supp. 1992). If so,
this implied duty could be viewed in tandem with a provider's other potential legal duties. If
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At this juncture, a closer look at the language of the statute will
shed light on its meaning. The language of the Act is generally clear
and unambiguous. ' 4 However, the rules of statutory construction will
be applied
to the Act's provisions to analyze any potential ambi147
guities.
1. Inherent Risk
In Wyoming, the determination of the existence and scope of a
duty are questions of law for the court.' 4' The statute employs a
judicial duty analysis consistent with Wyoming law, and the inherent
risk doctrine as espoused in Wright."49

the provider is a possessor of land, he will owe the participant certain duties pursuant to
Wyoming premises liability law and the Wyoming Recreational Use Statute. See Wyo. STAT.
§ 34-19-101,-106 (1990). For a discussion of the Act's interaction with premises liability law
and the Recreational Use Statute, see infra notes 183-210 and accompanying text. Of course,
whether to impose a duty in any given case is a question of law for the court. Ely, 707 P.2d
at 709. In any event, the Act contemplates the preservation of negligence claims against the
provider as stated in Wyo. STAT. §1-1-123(c), "[alctions based upon negligence of the provider
...shall be preserved pursuant to [the comparative negligence act." Wyo. STAT. §1-1-123(c)
(Supp. 1991).
145. See supra note 133 and accompanying text. Wyo. STAT. § l-l-122(a)(i)(Supp. 1991).
A possessor-provider may still owe no legal duty even absent an inherent risk. Recall the
evolution of the obvious danger rule as a "duty" limitation. Supra notes 97-109 and accompanying text. Under current Wyoming law a possessor owes no duty to his invitee for injuries
resulting from naturally existing conditions (i.e. accumulations of ice and snow) which are
known, obvious or reasonably apparent. Sherman v. Platte County, 642 P.2d 787, 789 (Wyo.
1982); Radosevich v. Board of County Commissioners, 776 P.2d 747, 749 n. 1 (Wyo. 1989);
and supra note 99 and accompanying text. Presumably this rule would still apply in the recreational context.
146. The primary goal in construing a statute is to ascertain legislative intent. If the words
of the statute are clear and unambiguous, legislative intent should be gleaned solely by analysis
of the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language. Allied-Signal v. Board of Equalization, 813 P.2d 214, 219 (Wyo. 1991). See also Wyo. STAT. § 8-1-101(a)(i) (1989).
147. Whether or not a statute is ambiguous is a question of law for the court. A statute
will be construed as ambiguous if it is vague, uncertain or subject to varying interpretations.
Allied-Signal, 813 P.2d at 219-20. As the Wyoming Supreme Court stated in State ex. rel.
Motor Vehicle Division v. Holtz, 674 P.2d 732, 736 (Wyo. 1983):
When the language is not clear or is ambiguous, the court must look to the mischief
the statute was intended to cure, the historical setting surrounding its enactment, the
public policy of the state, the conclusions of law, and other prior and contemporaneous facts and circumstances, making use of the accepted rules of construction
to ascertain a legislative intent that is reasonable and consistent.
Id.
148. Ely v. Kirk, 707 P.2d 706, 709 (Wyo. 1985).
149. See supra notes 2, 19-21; 29-30 and accompanying text. Other courts that have judicially determined under ski statutes whether or not the risk is inherent, and hence, whether
or not the operator owes a duty, include the following: Berniger v. Meadow Green-Wildcat
Corp., 945 F.2d 4, 8 (1st Cir. 1991); Williams v. Heavenly Valley, 946 F.2d 899 (9th Cir.
1992). Schmitz v. Cannonsburg Skiing Corp., 428 N.W.2d 742 (Mich. App. 1988).
In contrast, the Vermont courts have submitted the inherent risk issue to the jury. Dillworth
v. Gambardella, 776 F. Supp. 170, 172 (D.Vt. 1991). Under the Vermont statute, a model for
the Wyoming Act, skiers accept as a matter of law the inherent risks of skiing "insofar as
they are obvious and necessary." This language should leave the duty analysis to the judiciary.
However, in Dillworth, the Vermont Federal Court denied plaintiff's motion for new trial
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"Inherent risk" is defined and, as stated, is central to the duty
analysis.' 50 The judge must first determine whether the risk is "characteristic of or intrinsic" to the particular sport and second, whether
the risk can be "reasonably altered, eliminated or controlled."'' If
the risk is determined intrinsic to the sport, and, one which cannot
52
be reasonably altered, eliminated or controlled, it is an inherent risk.
The Act states that a provider has no duty to alter, eliminate or
control the inherent risks within a particular sport.'"
A fundamental problem with the language of Section 1-1-121(a)(i)
is that a judge may perceive that a question of fact exists as to what
is "reasonable." This would allow the jury to inappropiately engage
in the duty analysis. An amendment which would simplify the court's
inherent risk analysis would be the following: "Inherent risk means
any risk that is characteristicof, intrinsic to, or an integral part of
any sport or recreational opportunity." The court could then use the
"Gates" factors in tandem with the statute to determine whether the
risk was inherent, and hence whether the provider owed a legal duty."'

following a jury verdict for defendant operator. Plaintiff suffered severe injuries when he
collided with another skier on the slope. The court implicitly accepted the lower court's decision
to let the jury decide whether the risk was inherent, and hence whether the operator owed a
duty. The lower court had instructed the jury on Vermont's ski statute, informing them that
if they found that "plaintiff assumed the risk of the collision because such collisions are an
obvious and necessary part of the sport of skiing, you must return a verdict for the defendant."
Note how the court phrases the inherent risk doctrine in assumption of risk versus duty language. Id. at 172-73.
150. See supra note 133 and accompanying text. WYo. STAT. § l-l-122(a)(i) (Supp. 1992).
151. Id.
152. Id. This interpretation is clear from a careful reading of Wyo. STAT. § 1-1-122(i)
(Supp. 1992). An amendment which would clarify this reading would be the following: "Inherent risk means any risk that is 1) characteristic of or intrinsic to any sport or recreational
opportunity and 2) that which cannot reasonably be altered, eliminated or controlled."
153. See supra note 133 and accompanying text. WYo. STAT. § 1-1-123(b) (Supp. 1992).
What if a provider attempts to alter, eliminate or control what is later determined to be an
inherent risk? Must he do so commensurate with any standard of care? The Idaho ski statute
contains a provision which, like Wyoming, states that the operator has no duty to "alter,
control or lessen" the inherent risks of skiing. However, the statute lists certain operator's
duties which have been interpreted to be duties regarding inherent risks (i.e. posting signs).
IDAWo CoDE § 6-1103-04 (Supp. 1992). The statute goes further in saying that if the operator
does make an attempt to alter, control or lessen the inherent risks, such attempt need not be
accomplished "to any standard of care." Id. at § 6-1103(10). In Collins v. Schweitzer, Inc.,
774 F. Supp. 1253, 1262 (D. Id. 1991), the Idaho Federal Court construed this section to mean
that any attempt by the operator to accomplish the duties re: inherent risks as set out in the
statute could not constitute negligence.
Under the Wyoming Act, the nature of effort undertaken to alter or control a risk would
probably shed ultimate light on whether or not the risk should be viewed as inherent.
154. See discussion of prop6sed analytical framework, infra notes 224-234 and accompanying text. The statutory language "cannot reasonably be altered, eliminated or controlled"
unnecessarily complicates pure common law inherent risk analysis as espoused in Murphy v.
Steeplechase Amusement Co., 166 N.E. 173, 174 (N.Y. 1929); and Wright v. Mt. Mansfield
Lift, Inc., 96 F. Supp. 786 (D. Vt. 1951). See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text and
infra note 155 and accompanying text.
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What is an inherent risk? Courts and commentators disagree. In
Clover v. Snowbird, the Utah Supreme Court recently summarized
the scope of inherent risks as follows:
the term "inherent" refers to those risks that are essential
characteristics of skiing - risks that are so integrally related
to skiing that the sport cannot be undertaken without confronting these risks. Generally, these risks can be divided into
two categories. The first category of risks consists of those
risks, such as steep grades, powder, and mogul runs, which
skiers wish to confront as an essential characteristic of skiing
. . . .The second category of risks consists of those hazards
which no one wishes to confront but [sic] cannot be alleviated
by the use of reasonable care on the part of a ski resort. It
is without question that skiing is a dangerous activity. Hazards
may exist in locations where they are not readily discoverable.
Weather and snow conditions can suddenly change and, without warning, create new hazards where no hazard previously
existed. Hence, it is clearly foreseeable that a skier, without
skiing recklessly, may momentarily lose control or fall in an
unexpected manner.'"
This expansive definition takes in much of the Wright court's general
theory on inherent risks. 5 6 However, a reading of this language and
that presented in Wright solidifies why the determination of what is
an inherent risk must be an integral part of the duty analysis. The
court must be able to incorporate common law principles and changes
in technology to determine whether a particular risk should be clas7
sified as inherent, and thus, whether the operator owes a duty.'"
2.

Assumption of Inherent Risks

The Act goes on to provide that persons who participate in the
particular sport "assume the inherent risk of injury and all legal re-

155. 808 P.2d 1037, 1047 (Utah 1991).
156. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text. Note that the Wright court limited

inherent risks to those which were "obvious and necessary." The snow covered stump in Wright
was a latent danger, but one which the court nonetheless considered "obvious and necessary"
to the reasonable person who participates in the sport. Later courts used these terms to conclude
that the "obvious" element of "obvious and necessary" must mean open, plainly visible, or
something of which the plaintiff had actual knowledge. See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying
text. The drafters of the Wyoming Act avoided use of this language while still adhering to
the principles advanced in Wright v. Mt. Mansfield Lift, Inc., 96 F. Supp. 786 (D. Vt. 1951).
157. In judicially determining whether a risk is inherent under the Wyoming Act, it may

be worthwhile for the court to view other state statutes which list out specific inherent risks.
But see contra Harkins, supra note 45 at 153. Of course, a consideration of these other statutes
would not be determinative, because the court will use the "Gates" factors to ultimately determine whether the risk is inherent. See discussion of proposed analytical framework, infra
notes 224-234 and accompanying text.
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sponsibility for damage, injury or death . .. that results from the
inherent risks in that sport ... ."I This is simply the codification
of the common law principle 59 that the provider's duty does not
extend to protecting the participant from the inherent risks of the
sport.w6 Again, the Act is not resurrecting secondary assumption of
risk as a complete defense to a cause of action in negligence. 16' The
"assumption of risk" provision contained in 123(a) is simply the flipside of the "no duty" provision contained in 123(b). Full effect can
only be given to Wyo. Stat. §§ 1-1-123(a) and (b), by reaching this
62
This construction is consistent with the language of
conclusion.
Wright. 613

Because Wyo. Stat. § 1-1-123(a) is a restatement of the "noduty" provision contained in Wyo. Stat. § 1-1-123(b), and the "assumption of risk" terminology has so confused the inherent risk analysis, an appropriate amendment to that section would be the following:
"Any person who takes part in any sport or recreational opportunity
is legally responsiblefor damage, injury or death to himself or other
persons or property that results from the inherent risks in that sport
or recreational opportunity." The proposed amendment cuts out any
unneeded reference to assumption of risk, thereby eliminating the
possibility that Wyoming courts might confuse the inherent risk doctrine with secondary assumption of risk.
3.

Provider of Sport or Recreational Opportunity

These two terms have no common law legal significance, but are
both defined in the Act. '6 "Provider" is defined as one who "for
profit or otherwise' 65 , offers or conducts a sport or recreational op-

158. See supra note 133 and accompanying text. WYo. STAT. § 1-1-123(a) (Supp. 1992).
159. See supra note 133 and accompanying text. WYo. STAT. § 1-1-123(b) (Supp. 1992).
160. See supra notes 2 and 19-21 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text. Because assumption of risk is referred
to in its primary sense as a duty analysis, the elements of the classic defense of assumption
of risk: knowledge, appreciation and voluntary consent are not at issue. As explained in Wright,
plaintiff's mere participation in the sport implies knowledge of those risks deemed inherent.
Some writers disagree. See Harkins, supra note 45 at 350; Smissen, supra note 45 § 5.22 at
241-48. In any event, to the extent that those elements have any bearing on common law
primary assumption of risk, the Wyoming statute does not require their presence. Wyo. STAT.
§ 1-1-123(a) (Supp. 1992).
162. A resort to rules of statutory construction reveals that a court must avoid absurd
results in legislation, must harmonize every section of a statute, and must not construe a portion
of a statute so as to render other portions meaningless. Stauffer Chemical Co. v. Curry, 778
P.2d 1083, 1093 (Wyo. 1989); Reliance v. Chevron, 713 P.2d 766, 770 (Wyo. 1986).
163. See supra notes 2 and 19-21 and accompanying text.
164. See supra note 133 and accompanying text. Wyo. STAT. §§ I-l-122(a)(ii),(iii) (Supp.
1992).
165. Otherwise is defined as "in another way; differently." THE AhaascAN HEuTAoE
DWCTIONARY 931 (Ed. 1981). This language therefore appears to make the Act applicable, whether
or not a fee is charged to the participant. DiVenere v. University of Wyoming, 811 P.2d 273,
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portunity."' This section gives a scope to those persons or entities,
private or public, governed by the Act. Provider includes profit, non
profit, private and governmental entities. This necessarily includes the
federal government, the state of Wyoming and Wyoming municipalities. 167 This section specifically exempts any product liability based
cause of action premised on design or manufacture of recreational
equipment.16a Sport or recreational activity 69is defined to include a
non-exclusive list of a variety of activities.
4.

Interaction with Comparative Negligence Act

The Act expressly preserves actions against the provider for the
provider's negligence. 70 However, the language of Wyo. Stat. § 1-1123(c) as drafted, may be viewed as ambiguous. The provision reads:
"Actions based upon negligence of the provider not caused by an
inherent risk of the sport or recreational opportunity shall be preserved pursuant to W.S. I-1-109.'' This provision might be interpreted to mean that an action for negligence can only be maintained
against a provider where the negligence is not caused by an inherent
risk of the sport.
Reading the statute as a whole, an amendment which would harmonize this provision with §§ 1-1-123(a) and (b) (the provider has
172
no duty regarding inherent risks) would be the following:
Actions based upon negligence of the provider wherein the
injury was not the result of an inherent risk of the sport or
recreational opportunity shall be preserved pursuant to W.S.
1-1-109.

275 (Wyo. 1991) (if statute is unambiguous, words of statute are interpreted by reference to
their plain and ordinary meaning). For a discussion of the Act's potential interaction with
Wyoming's Recreational Use Statute in these "no-fee" situations, see infra notes 194-210 and
accompanying text.
166. WYo. STAT. § 1-1-122(a)(ii) (Supp. 1992). A provider may or may not be a possessor
of land. For a discussion of the Act's interaction with Wyoming premises liability law, see
infra notes 183-193 and accompanying text.
167. Id. The federal government is covered by the Act to the extent that no other federal
acts pre-empt state legislation in this area. Furthermore, it is important to note the interplay
which must exist between the application of the Act and the Federal and Wyoming Tort Claims
Acts. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346 (West Supp. 1992); WYO. STAT. § 1-39-106 (Supp. 1991). Those acts
provide exceptions to government immunity in certain circumstances. id. A plaintiff suing the
state or federal government would need to comply with the notice of claim provisions and
other requirements contained in those acts prior to any application of the Recreation Safety
Act. Id.
168. See supra note 133 and accompanying text. WYo. STAT. § l-l-122(a)(ii) (Supp. 1992).
169. See supra note 133 and accompanying text. WYo. STAT. § l-l-122(a)(iii) (Supp. 1992).
170. WYo. STAT. § 1-1-123(c)(1977).
171. This statutory reference is to Wyoming's Comparative Negligence Act.
172. See supra note 162.
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This amended language is consistent with the Act's intent to prevent
plaintiff's recovery where the injury results from an inherent risk.
Alternatively, the amended language clarifies that plaintiff may pursue a negligence claim against the provider if the injury is not the
result of an inherent risk.'7
Wyo. Stat. § 1-1-123(c)'s language preserving provider negligence
claims makes a direct reference to Wyoming's Comparative Negligence Act. 7 4 However, the Comparative Negligence Act would only
come into play following the court's application of the inherent risk
doctrine, as codified in the Act.
If the court determines that the injury results from an inherent
risk, the provider owes no legal duty, plaintiff's cause of action must
fail, and the Comparative Negligence Act is unaffected.' 75 If the injury does not result from an inherent risk, plaintiff may go on to
'
prove that the provider's negligence caused his injuries. 176 Provider
may then assert that plaintiff's contributory negligence caused or contributed to the injury.177 The Comparative Negligence Act would then
be applied by the trier of fact to compare the fault of the parties
accordingly.

17

1

173. The Utah Supreme Court's holding in Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, illustrates the
importance of including this "preservation of operator negligence claims" provision in a statute.
808 P.2d 1037, 1046 (Utah 1991). In that case, the court was interpreting Utah's Inherent Risk
of Skiing Statute, which does not include a provision expressly preserving operator negligence
claims. Plaintiff was injured when he collided with another skier, following the latter skier's
jump off a steep incline. The Utah statute provides that:
an "inherent risk of skiing" means those dangers or conditions which are an integral
part of the sport of skiing, including, but not limited to: ". . . variations in steepness
or terrain" and "collisions with other skiers" and further provides that "no person
engaged in [skiing] shall recover from a ski operator for injuries resultingfrom those
inherent risks." (Emphasis added).

The Utah Supreme Court, constructing a very convoluted interpretation of the statute, reversed
the lower court's grant of summary judgment for Snowbird. The court held that, pursuant to
the statutory language, an inherent risk can only bar recovery if, under the facts of each case,
the risk is an "integral aspect of the sport of skiing." The court then held that the existence
of a "blind jump" with a landing area located on a high traffic slope is not an "essential
characteristic of an intermediate run." The court then reversed, holding that a genuine issue
of fact existed as to whether Snowbird exercised reasonable care. Id. at 1044-48.
The court should have focused on a basic question: was the injury the result of an inherent
risk or the result of a breach of duty by Snowbird? The statute already provides that recovery
is barred only for injuries "resulting from" inherent risks. It is certainly implied that if the
injury does not result from an inherent risk, a plaintiff can proceed to prove provider negligence.
174. Wyo. STAT. § 1-1-109 (1988).
175. See supra notes 141-143 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 31, 144-145 and accompanying text. The term "negligence" is oftentimes used to describe defendant's breach of a legal duty. ABC Builders v. Phillips, 632
P.2d 925, 930 (Wyo. 1981). See supra note 144, for a discussion of a provider's potential legal
duties to a participant.
177. See supra notes 32-34.
178. WYO. STAT. § 1-1-109 (1988). Is it possible for the injury to be caused partially by

negligence of the provider and partially by an inherent risk? The Oregon Court of Appeals
said yes in Jessup v. Mt. Bachelor, Inc., a decision affirming summary judgment for the ski
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The inherent risk doctrine, as codified in the Act, works as a
"duty analysis" and does not impinge upon the Comparative Negligence Act. The Act simply clarifies what should happen anyway
under the common law inherent risk doctrine as originally espoused
in Wright. The Act does not revive secondary assumption of risk as
a complete defense to a cause of action. 7 9
5. Interaction with Wyoming Premises Liability Law,
Recreational Use Statute' 80 and Skier Responsibility Statute 8 '
Although the Act does not include an express reference to other
related Wyoming statutes or to common law premises liability, it is

operator. 792 P.2d 1232 (Or. App. 1990). The operator had raised the statutorily defined
inherent risk doctrine as an affirmative defense to plaintiff's claim of injuries resulting from
a skier collision. The jury was instructed that an operator has no duty for injuries resulting
from the inherent risks of the sport. The jury instruction left to the jury the question of whether
a collision was an inherent risk. In response to an alternate argument posed by plaintiff, the
court held that the Oregon statute allows for the application of comparative negligence in cases
where injury results from a combination of both an inherent risk and operator negligence. Id.
at 1233. Accord, Hiibschmnan v. City of Valdez, 821 P.2d 1354, 1363 (Alaska 1991).
179. The Wyoming Supreme Court held in Brittain v. Booth, that "assumption of risk,
as a form of contributory negligence is not an absolute defense to a negligence action, but is
a basis for apportionment of fault." 601 P.2d 532, 534 (Wyo. 1979). Based upon this pronouncement, Wyoming Civil Pattern Jury Instruction § 3.07 does not recommend an instruction
on assumption of risk. This makes sense because secondary assumption of risk is simply a
form or phase of contributory negligence. Id. The defense of contributory negligence "necessarily presupposes negligence for which the defendant is liable, which would be actionable
but for the concurrence of the contributory negligence." Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Bunce,
62 P.2d 1297, 1301 (Wyo. 1936). As clearly identified in Meistrich, the term "assumption of
risk" used in its primary sense is simply a misnomer. The primary assumption of risk doctrine
undertakes a duty analysis to determine if there is a legal duty in the first instance. If there
is not, there can be no negligence. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text. Therefore,
the Wyoming Supreme Court's pronouncement in Brittain, must have contemplated the merger
only of assumption of risk in its secondary sense into contributory negligence. 601 P.2d at
534. In any event the Act forces this result in the inherent risk context.
180. Wyo. STAT. §§ 34-19-101, -106 (1977). This statute is entitled "Liability of Owners
of Land Used for Recreation Purposes" but has been cited by Davis, supra note 13 as the
"Recreational Use Statute." The statute provides:
§ 34-19-101. Definitions.
(a) As used in this act:
(i) "Land" means land, including state land, roads, water, water-courses, private ways and buildings, structures, and machinery or equipment when attached
to the realty;
(ii) "Owner" means the possessor of a fee interest, a tenant, lessee, including
a lessee of state lands, occupant or person in control of the premises;
(iii) "Recreational purpose" includes, but is not limited to, any one (1) or more
of the following: hunting, fishing, swimming, boating, camping, picnicking, hiking, pleasure driving, nature study, water skiing, winter sports and viewing or
enjoying historical, archaeological, scenic or scientific sites;
(iv) "Charge" means the admission price or fee asked in return for invitation
or permission to enter or go upon the land;
(v) "This act" means W.S. 34-19-101 through 34-19-106. (Laws 1965, ch. 9, §
1; W.S. 1957, § 34-389.1; Laws 1989, ch. 27, § 2.)
§ 34-19-102. Landowner's duty of care or duty to give warnings.
Except as specifically recognized by or provided in W.S. 34-19-105, an owner of land
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important to highlight the interrelationship between
these laws, thus
82
clarifying the scope and breadth of the Act.

owes no duty of care to keep the premises safe for entry or use by others for recreational purposes, or to give any warning of a dangerous condition, use, structure
or activity on such premises to persons entering for recreational purposes. (Laws
1965, ch. 9, § 2; W.S. 1957, § 34-389.2; Laws 1989, ch. 27, § 2.)
§ 34-19-103. Limitations on landowner's liability.
(a) Except as specifically recognized by or provided in W.S. 34-19-15, an owner of
land who either directly or indirectly invites or permits without charge any person
to use the land for recreational purposes or a lessee of state lands does not thereby:
(i) Extend any assurance that the premises are safe for any purpose;
(ii) Confer upon the person using the land the legal status of an invitee or licensee
to whom a duty of care is owed;
(iii) Assume responsibility for or incur liability for any injury to person or property
caused by an act of omission of the person using the land. (Laws 1965, ch. 9, §
3; W.S. 1957, § 34-389.3; Laws 1989, ch. 27, § 2.)
§ 34-19-104. Application to land leased to state or political subdivision thereof.
Unless otherwise agreed in writing W.S. 34-19-102 and 34-19-103 shall be deemed
applicable to the duties and liability of an owner of land leased to the state or any
subdivision of this state for recreational purposes. (Laws 1965, ch. 9, § 4; W.S. 1957,
§ 34-389.4; Laws 1989, ch. 27, § 2.)leb
§ 34-19-105. When landowner's liability not limited.
(a) Nothing in this act limits in any way any liability which otherwise exists:
(i) For willful or malicious failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition,
use, structure, or activity;
(ii) For injury suffered in any case where the owner of land charges the persons
who enter or go on the land for recreational purposes, except that in the case of
land leased to the state or a subdivision of this state, any consideration received
by the owner for the lease shall not be deemed a charge within the meaning of
this section. (Laws 1965, ch. 9, § 5; W.S. 1957, § 34-389.5; Laws 1989, ch. 27,
§ 2.)
§ 34-19-106. Duty of care, not created; duty of care of persons using land.
(a) Nothing in this act shall be construed to:
(i) Create a duty of care or ground of liability for injury to persons or property;
(ii) Relieve any person using the land of another for recreational purposes from
any obligation which he may have in the absence of this act to exercise care in
his use of the land and in his activities on the land, or from the legal consequences
of failure to employ such care. (Laws 1965, ch. 9, § 6; W.s. 1957, § 324-389.6;
Laws 1989, ch. 27, § 2.)
181. WYO. STAT. § 6-9-201 and § 6-9-301 (Supp. 1992).
§ 6-9-201. Trespass on closed or unsafe areas within ski areas; penalty; exceptions.
(a) A person is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more than one
hundred dollars ($100.00) if he:
(i) Skis on a slope or trail that has been posted as "closed;"
(ii) Knowingly enters upon public or private lands from an adjoining ski area
when the lands have been closed by the owner and posted as closed by the owner
or by the ski area operator; or
(iii) Intentionally enters state or federal land leased and in use as a ski area, knowing:
(A) The lessee of the premises has designated the land as an unsafe area; or
(B) The land has been posted with warning signs, prohibiting entry, which
are reasonably likely to come to the attention of 'the public.
(b) This section does not apply to peace officers, national park or forest service
officers, or persons authorized by the lessee of the premises. (Laws 1982, ch. 75, §
3; 1989, ch. 202, § 1.)
§ 6-9-301. Skier safety; skiing while impaired; unsafe skiing; collisions; penalties.
(a) No person shall move uphill on any passenger tramway or use any ski slope or
trail while such person's ability to do so is impaired by the consumption of alcohol
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a. Premises Liability Law. As already demonstrated, premises
liability law has interacted with the inherent risk doctrine throughout
its history."8 3 In Wyoming, a land possessor's legal duties are still4
governed by whether the entrant is an invitee, licensee or trespasser.'
A possessor owes an invitee affirmative duties to inspect the land,
and warn of or make safe any dangerous conditions.' 8' A possessor's
duty to a licensee or trespasser is the same: not to willfully or wantonly injure him. 8 6 The Act does not express any intended abrogation
of common law. 87 Therefore, premises liability law should continue
to interphase with the inherent risk doctrine as codified in the Act.
Because the Act covers a variety of recreational opportunities,
premises law may or may not be involved. A provider could either
be a possessor (e.g. ski area) or a non-possessor (e.g. climbing or
rafting company). 88
If the provider is a possessor, the participant would either be an
invitee or licensee. 8 9 The possessor-provider would owe no legal duty
to the participant for injuries determined to result from an inherent
risk. 9° Alternatively, if the participant's injuries were determined not
or by the use of any illicit controlled substance or other drug as defined by W.S.
35-7-1002.
(b) No person shall ski in reckless disregard of his safety or the safety of others.
(c) No skier involved in a collision with another person in which an injury results
shall leave the vicinity of the collision before giving his name and current address
to an employee of the ski area operator or a member of the ski patrol except for
the purpose of securing aid for a person injured in the collision, in which event the
person leaving the scene of the collision shall give his name and current address as
required by this subsection within twenty-four (24) hours after securing aid.
(d) Any person violating this section is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than twenty (20) days, a fine of not more than two hundred
dollars ($200.00), or both. (Laws 1989, ch. 202, § 2.)
182. The Wyoming Supreme Court has held:
All statutes are presumed to be enacted by the legislature with full knowledge of the
existing state of law with reference thereto and statutes are therefore to be construed
in harmony with the existing law, and as a part of an overall and uniform system
of jurisprudence, and their meaning and effect is to be determined in connection,
not only with the common law and the constitution, but also with reference to the
decisions of the courts. Matter of Adoption of Voss, 550 P.2d 481, 486 (Wyo. 1976).
183. See supra notes 19-28 and accompanying text.
184. Yalowizer v. Husky Oil Co., 629 P.2d 465, 466 (Wyo. 1981); see also supra note
23. Note that the Recreational Use Statute, supra note 180, is an exception to this rule.
185. Radosevich v. Board of County Commissioners, 776 P.2d 747, 749 (Wyo. 1989); See
also supra note 25.
186. Yalowizer, 629 P.2d at 466; see also supra note 26.
187. State v. Stovall, 648 P.2d 543, 546-47 (Wyo. 1982)."mhe presumption is that no
change is intended [in the common law] unless the statute is explicit." Id.
188. See supra notes 97; 144; 166.
189. If the possessor-provider obtains any real or potential economic benefit from the
participant, the participant will be considered an invitee. Sinclair Refining Company v. Redding,
439 P.2d 20, 23 (Wyo. 1968). Note that if participant pays no fee and provider is considered
to fall within the scope of the Recreational Use Statute, the premises classifications are eliminated. Wyo. STAT. § 34-19-102,-03 (1977). See infra notes 194-210 and accompanying text for
a discussion of the Act's interaction with the Recreational Use Statute.
'%190. Wyo. STAr. § 1-1-123 (Supp. 1992).
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to result from an inherent risk, the court should consider whether a
possessor-provider owes a legal duty under premises liability law. 91
A non-possessor provider would also owe the participant no legal
duty if the injuries were determined to result from an inherent risk.'92
However, in contrast, if the participant's injuries were determined
not to result from an inherent risk, the court should consider whether
provider owes a legal duty under another legal prina non-possessor
t93
ciple.
b. Recreational Use Statute. Unlike the Act, the Recreational
Use Statute only encompasses cases involving premises liability and
cases where no fee is paid for the use of the land.9 Furthermore,
the statute applies to a "recreational purpose."' 95 The definition of
"recreational purpose" includes a broader variety of activities than
the inherent risk "sport or recreational opportunit[ies]"I'

the Act.1 97

defined in

The statute works to limit the liability of a land possessor is who
"directly or indirectly invites or permits without charge any person
to use the land for recreational purposes."'

99

The statute eliminates

the distinction between "invitees," "licensees" and "trespassers" and
provides that a possessor's only duty of care to persons using the
land for recreational purposes is to refrain from willfully or maliciously failing to "guard or warn against a dangerous condition." 200

191. See supra notes 184-86 and accompanying text and note 188. Note that the court
could view a possessor's duties under premises liability law in tandem with any duty implied
in Wyo. STAT. § 1-1-122(a)(i) (supra note 133 and accompanying text) to reasonably alter,
eliminate or control non-inherent risks. See supra note 144.
192. WYo. STAT. § 1-1-123 (Supp. 1992).
193. WYO. STAT. § 1-1-122(a)(i) (Supp. 1992). Note that this issue could be influenced by
any duty implied in Wyo. STAT. § I-l-122(a)(i), to reasonably alter, eliminate or control noninherent risks. See supra note 144.
194. WYo. STAT. § 34-19-102-03; § 34-19-105 (1977). Note that this is in contrast to the
Act, which applies in cases where a "provider" "offers or conducts" a "recreational opportunity" "for profit or otherwise." WYo. STAT. § l-1-122(a)(ii) (Supp. 1992). See supra notes
164-65 and accompanying text. See Davis, supra note 13, for a detailed discussion and analysis
of the Wyoming Recreational Use Statute.
195. WYO. STAT. § 34-19-101(a)(iii) (1990).
196. WYO. STAT. § l-l-122(a)(iii) (Supp. 1992).
197. Recreational purpose is defined to include: "picnicking ... pleasure driving, nature
study, viewing or enjoying historical, archaeological, scenic or scientific sites." WYo. STAT. §
34-19-101(a)(iii) (1990).
198. The statute defines an "owner" of land to include those with less than a fee interest,
e.g. lessees and those persons "in control of the premises." Wyo. STAT. § 34-19-101(a)(ii)
(1990). Therefore, for clarity, the term "possessor" is used.
199. Id. (emphasis added). The statute also applies to limit the duties and liability of an
owner of lands leased to the state. WYo. STAT. § 34-19-104 (1990).
200. Wyo. STAT. § 34-19-105 (1990). Note that, under Wyoming premises law, a possessor's
duty to licensees and trespassers is the same: to refrain from willful or wanton injury. Yalowizer
v. Husky Oil Co., 629 P.2d 465, 466 (Wyo. 1981); see supra notes 26 and 186 and accompanying
text. Therefore, the statute only effectively alters a possessor's common law duties to invitees.
See Davis, supra note 13 at 656.
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This type of legislation was apparently enacted to encourage land
possessors to make their land available to the public for recreational
use.201

Because the Recreational Use Statute only encompasses premises
cases where no fee is paid by the entrant, its potential interactiono
with the Act appears limited to the following type scenario: Possessor
has set up cross-country ski trails on his property for use by him and
his friends. Possessor invites Party A to use his land, without charge,
for cross-country skiing32°3 If Party A is injured in connection with
a condition of the premises, Possessor may be liable under the Recreational Use Statute only for willful or malicious failure to protect
against or warn of the condition. 2°4
Could Possessor also be considered a "provider," thus triggering
application of the Act? 20s A provider includes one who "for profit
or otherwise, offers or conducts a sport or recreational opportu'' 7
nity." 2 If Possessor's invitation to ski is considered an "offered"
recreational opportunity, he would also be covered by the Act. 2 Under the Act, if the injury is determined to result from an inherent
risk, Possessor would owe no legal duty to Party A. 209 If the injury
is determined not to result from an inherent risk, Possessor may be
liable under the Recreational Use Statute only for willful or malicious
210
failure to protect against or warn of a dangerous condition.
c. Skier Responsibility Statute. Under the Skier Responsibility
Statute a skier is subject to criminal liability for engaging in certain
types of prohibited conduct while participating in the sport of skiing. 21' This statute should only interphase with the Act in a limited
201. Davis, supra note 13, at 650.
202. The Wyoming Supreme Court has held that it will interpret statutes related to the
same subject matter in harmony with one another, whenever possible. Stauffer Chemical Co.
v. Curry, 778 P.2d 1083, 1093 (Wyo. 1989). See also supra, note 182.
203. WYo. STAT. § 34-19-101(a)(iii) (1990) defines "recreational purpose" to include "winter sports."
204. WYo. STAT. § 34-19-105 (1990).
205. WYO. STAT. § 1-1-122(a)(ii) (Supp. 1992).
206. Id.
207. Offer means to propose or provide. THE AMERIcAN HERrrAGE DICTONARY 931 (1981).

DiVenere v. University of Wyoming, 811 P.2d 273, 275 (Wyo. 1991) (words of an unambiguous
statute are given their plain and ordinary meaning). It appears that provider's invitation could
be considered an "offer."
208. In many cases, a "provider" under the Act will charge a fee to participants (i.e.
downhill skiing, float trips, dude trail rides). If a fee is charged, the Recreational Use Statute
would not apply (and thus not interact with the Act) in a subsequent action against the provider.
Wyo. STAT. § 34-19-105(a)(ii) (1977).
209. Wyo. STAT § 1-1-123 (Supp. 1992).
210. WYO. STAT. § 34-19-105(a)(i) (1990). Note that if Wyo. STAT. § 1-1-122(a)(i) is construed to require the provider to reasonably alter, eliminate or control non-inherent risks, there
is a potential conflict with a possessor's limited duties under the Recreation Use Statute. See
supra note 144.
211. WYo. STAT. §§ 6-9-201 to -301 (Supp. 1992). See text of statute, supra note 181 and
accompanying text.
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way, 21 2 illustrated by the following example: Plaintiff is injured in a
fall on provider's ski slope. A subsequent blood alcohol test proves
him legally drunk at the time of the fall. He 21is3 criminally convicted
under the statute and pays the required fine.
Plaintiff later files a cause of action sounding in negligence against
the provider to recover damages for injuries incurred in the fall. If
plaintiff's injuries are determined to result from an inherent risk,
provider owes no legal duty to plaintiff, and plaintiff's cause of action
must fail.214 Therefore, plaintiff's conviction would be irrelevant to
the inquiry. If, however, his injuries were determined not to result
from an inherent risk, the violation of the statute could be evidence
contribweighed by the trier of fact in assessing plaintiff's potential
21
utory negligence under the Comparative Negligence Act. 1
B.

ProposedAnalytical Framework For the Judiciary

How will the Act be interpreted and applied? Defense attorneys
will use the Act in support of pre-trial motions to dismiss or for
defense of
summary judgment. 216 The Act should be pled under the
21 7
failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted.
Alternatively, plaintiffs bear the burden of presenting evidence
of the elements of a cause of action in negligence. 211Plaintiff must
present evidence that the provider breached a legal duty, and that
that breach was a proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. 2 9 Plaintiffs'
attorneys will therefore incorporate the Act into their initial com-

212. And, of course, only in the skiing context. Id.

213. The statute provides that "[nio person shall ... use any ski slope or trail while such
person's ability to do so is impaired by the consumption of alcohol." Wyo. STAT. § 6-9-301(a)
(Supp. 1992). Violation of this section amounts to a misdemeanor and can result in a fine,
imprisonment, or both. Wyo. STAT. § 6-9-301(d) (Supp. 1992).
214. WYo. STAT. § 1-1-123 (Supp. 1992).
215. WYo. STAT. § 1-1-109 (1986). A party's violation of a statute may be considered as

evidence of negligence. Short v. Spring Creek Ranch, 731 P.2d 1195, 1198-99 (Wyo. 1987).
See also supra notes 170-79 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Act's interaction
with the Comparative Negligence Act.
216. W.R.C.P, 12 and 56.

217. The Act should not be used as a basis for the affirmative defense of assumption of
risk. This will only result in confusion with secondary assumption of risk or contributory
negligence. If it appears to defense counsel that contributory negligence is a viable affirmative
defense, it should by all means be pled. Then, if defendant fails in his pre-trial motions, he
can assert the affirmative defense and urge that despite defendant's alleged negligence, plaintiff
was contributorily negligent. Defendant then has the burden of proving the presence of contributory negligence, or plaintiff's failure to use ordinary care under the circumstances. See
Wyo. Civ. Pattern Jury Instructions, No. 10.01 (September 1981) (contributory negligence defined as a "failure to use ordinary care"). Plaintiff's actual knowledge and appreciation of
the risk would then be viewed by the court or jury in assessing plaintiffs share of contributory
fault. O'Donnell v. City of Casper, 696 P.2d 1278, 1284 (Wyo. 1985).
218. Pine Creek Canal No. I v. Stadler, 685 P.2d 13, 16 (Wyo. 1984); see also supra note
31 and accompanying text.
219. Id.
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plaint, urging that the injury resulted from a non-inherent risk and
that the cause of the injury was provider negligence.22
"
The court must then determine the existence of a legal duty. 2
This will generally be done within the context of pre-trial motions
to dismiss or for summary judgment.m In applying the Act, the court
must analyze whether or not the injury resulted from an inherent
risk, and hence, whether or not the provider owed a legal duty.2
The court's duty determination is fundamental. The court can

implement the analytical framework it has previously used in Gates
v. Richardson24 to conduct this duty analysis. This framework utilizes
common law principles to determine whether or not a provider owes
a duty, and hence whether or not recovery is barred. 5
In United States v. Carroll Towing, Judge Learned Hand defined
the duty analysis as a function of three broad variables: 1) "P" is
the probability of the risk to cause injury; 2) "L" is the potential
gravity of the resulting injury; and, 3) "B" is the burden upon the
defendant of taking adequate precautions. Hand summarized that if
the burden on defendant was less than the probability of injury multiplied by the gravity -of resulting
injury, or, B<PL, then a duty
6
should extend to defendant.2

Like Judge Hand, the Wyoming Supreme Court has recognized
that the question of whether to impose a duty in any given case is
dependent on various factors:
***The judge's function in a duty determination involves complex considerations of legal and social policies which will directly affect the essential determination of the limits to
government protection. Consequently,***the imposition and
scope of a legal duty is dependent not only on the factor of
foreseeability [citations omitted] but involves other consid-

220. WYO. STAT. § 1-1-123 (Supp. 1992).
221. In Wyoming, the existence and scope of a legal duty are questions of law for the
court to decide. Ely v. Kirk, 707 P.2d 706, 709 (Wyo. 1985). However, some commentators
believe that the trier of fact should decide whether the injury results from an inherent risk,
and thus, whether the provider owes a legal duty. See Dillworth v. Gambardella, 776 F. Supp.
170, 173 (D. Vt. 1991); Harkins, supra note 45 at 351. See supra note 178 (discussing the
possibility of injuries resulting from a combination of both provider negligence and an inherent
risk).
222. W.R.C.P., 12 and 56.
223. Wyo. STAT. § 1-1-122(a)(i) (Supp. 1992). See also supra notes 141-43 and accompanying text and notes 151-153 and accompanying text.
224. 719 P.2d 193 (Wyo. 1986).
225. The judge may decide to submit the "inherent risk" question to the jury. However,
this would necessarily and inappropriately involve the jury in the duty determination, usually
a question of law for the court. See supra note 148 and infra note 227 and accompanying
text.
226. 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2nd Cir. 1947).
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erations, including the magnitude of the risk involved in defendant's conduct, the burden of requiring defendant to guard
against that risk, and the consequences of placing that burden
upon the defendant ....

***Duty is not sacrosanct in itself,

but only an expression of the sum total of those considerations
of policy which leads the law to say that the plaintiff is entitled
to protection.2'
The Wyoming Supreme Court has looked to eight specific factors
(the "Gates" factors) in conducting its duty analysis. These factors
include:
1) [t]he foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff;
2) the closeness of the connection between the defendant's
conduct and the injury suffered;
3) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury;
4) the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct;
5) the policy of preventing future harm;
6) the extent of the burden upon the defendant;
7) the consequences to the community and the court system,
and;
8) the availability, cost and prevalence of insurance for the
risk involved .2

These factors provide the court with a framework for determining the existence of a legal duty in a negligence case. 9 However, the
Wyoming Supreme Court has noted that there is no "scientific formula" for determining whether a duty exists.2 Therefore, these factors should be used in conjunction with broad policy notions to allow
the court to determine in any given case whether a risk is inherent,
and hence, whether a legal duty exists.' l The following
scenario il2
lustrates how the framework might be employed.
227. Mostert v. CBL & Associates, 741 P.2d 1090, 1093 (Wyo. 1987) (Citations omitted).
228. Mostert, 741 P.2d at 1094. These eight factors cited in Gates were taken from Tarasoff
v. Regents of University of California, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976). See also Pickle v. Board of
County Com'rs, 764 P.2d 262, 265 (Wyo. 1988).
229. If viewed closely, these eight factors implicitly fit within the Hand B<PL variables.
Factors 6 and 8 going to the "B" variable, factors 1, 2 and 5 going to the "P" variable and
factors 3, 4 and 7 going to the "L" factor.
230. Pickle, 764 P.2d at 265.

231. The Wyoming Supreme Court has noted that the first two "Gates" factors are somewhat useless in the duty analysis. Pickle, 764 P.2d at 269; Gates, 719 P.2d at 196. Further,

the court has found that the "Gates" factors need not be weighed equally nor should any one
factor necessarily be dispositive in the duty analysis. Id. The "Gates" factors implicitly fit
within the "Hand" balancing test. See supra note 229. Therefore it might be simpler for the
court to employe the "Hand" test in conducting its duty analysis. See supra note 226 and
accompanying text.
Use of the "Hand" test would presumably incorporate may of the factors discussed by
the Colorado Courts in Smith v. City and County of Denver, 726 P.2d 1125 (Colo. 1986) and
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Scenario: A privately owned ski area ("provider") uses net-like
fences for traffic control purposes. Plaintiff skier turns, hits the net
and then takes a fall, suffering injuries. Plaintiff sues provider for
negligence in creating the hazardous condition. Following discovery,
defendant moves for summary judgment, urging that the net 233 was
an inherent risk of skiing, and that plaintiff's claim should be dismissed.234 How should the judge analyze whether a legal duty exists
under the Act?
Are nets of this kind characteristic of or intrinsic to the sport
of skiing? The evidence shows that 95% of all ski areas across the
country use this type of netting on their mountains for similar purposes. It appears it is characteristic of the sport.
Can the net be reasonably altered, eliminated or controlled? The
evidence shows there has been no injury resulting from the use of
these nets over the past 15 years. Correspondingly, the evidence shows
that over the past 15 years, the nets have controlled skier traffic and
reduced the number of reckless and out-of-control skiers. The evidence also shows that a flexible versus rigid net is the most practical
traffic control device in that it protects skiers from injuries resulting
from impact with the net.

University of Denver v. Whitlock, 744 P.2d 54 (Colo. 1986). Factors analyzed by the court
include: the likelihood of the injury versus social utility, the burden of guarding against the
risk, the consequences of placing the burden upon the actor, and public and social interests.
For a discussion of how this duty analysis can be employed in the skiing context, see Ferguson,
supra note 2, at 186-92. The Wyoming Supreme Court has already recognized the value of
considering the factors highlighted in Smith and Whitlock. See Mostert, 741 P.2d at 1093.
232. This scenario highlights only selected hypothetical facts and is presented for illustrative
purposes only. The scenario is not intended to encompass an analysis of every legal or factual
issue that might be raised in a case involving these types of nets, e.g. a cause of action based
upon defective design or manufacture. See Wyo. STAT. § l-1-122(a)(iii) (S.upp. 1992). Furthermore, the scenario is not intended to illustrate the only method for interpreting or applying
the Act.
233. The net is made of a flexible plastic type material.
234. These facts were altered, but extracted from Berniger v. Meadow Green Mountain.
945 F.2d 4 (1st Cir. 1991). The court of appeals affirmed the lower court's motion to dismiss,
ruling as a matter of law that the net which caused plaintiff's injuries was an inherent risk
within the scope of New Hampshire's statutorily defined inherent risks. Id. at 8 (quoting N.H.
REV. STAT. § 225-A:4).
See also Burke v. Ski America, Inc., in which the circuit court affirmed a directed verdict
for defendant. 940 F.2d 95 (4th Cir. 1991). In that case, plaintiff, an expert skier, slid on an
icy slope, falling underneath a section of border safety netting, ultimately suffering injuries
from collisions with stones and trees. Plaintiff alleged that she assumed the plastic netting
existed to protect her from the hazards existing along the edge of the slope. The court employed
a two pronged test to determine duty: plaintiff must establish that the injury was not caused
by an inherent risk of skiing, and was not caused by an obvious condition of the premises.
The court muddled its analysis of the two prongs and did not specifically address proximate
cause, but did affirm that collectively, the rocks and trees were inherent risks of the sport,
and that no evidence existed to show that the ice, slope design and/or netting used, deviated
from ordinary custom. Id. at 97.
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factors indicates the following:

1) it was foreseeable that a plaintiff might run into the net;
2) the connection between defendant's conduct and the injury
suffered was not remote, but insignificant in that defendant's purpose in using the net was to control traffic and
to have skiers ski in control;
3) it is sufficiently certain that plaintiff suffered injuries, but
this is a neutral factor;
4) there is no moral blame associated with the defendant's
conduct;
5) provider's purpose in erecting the net was to slow skiers
at critical points to minimize future harm; the evidence
shows that the absence of the net would increase the potential for injuries;
6) current technology will not allow for the net to be reasonably altered, therefore, to require elimination of the net
will place a burden on the ski area: a) the liability risk and
attendant cost of defending against increased claims arising
from reckless skiing incidents, and; b) the need to find an
alternative method to control skier traffic;
7) if the nets are eliminated, the court and community will
suffer because of the increased risk of skier injuries and
attendant increase in lawsuits;
8) if the nets are eliminated, provider's insurance rates may
increase, because of its perceived failure to implement practical measures to reduce the number of reckless and outof-control skiers.
Considering all of the above factors it is evident that the net is characteristic of skiing and that it cannot reasonably be altered or eliminated and still effectively perform a traffic control function. The
provider therefore owes plaintiff no legal duty for injuries resulting
from collision with the net (an inherent risk of the sport) and the
motion for summary judgement should be granted.
V.

LEGISLATIVE VERSUS JuDICIAL APPROACH

Is Wyoming's judicial approach better than the comprehensive
legislative approach taken in Colorado? Some commentators say no.73

235. Farrow, supra note 8, at 284 (The writer urges specific legislation rather than judicial
discretion: "Only the proper combination of (specific) safety requirements and (specific) limitation on an operator's liability will equitably serve the interest of both legislators and skiers.")
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Certainly, a statute defining duties of operator and participant, and
spelling out the scope of inherent risks, informs the respective parties
of their future obligations. In a sparsely populated state like Wyoming, where little, if any, interpretive case law trickles down from the
Wyoming Supreme Court, this approach appears attractive at first
blush. 2 6 However, an operator gains no real predictability if a statutory list of inherent risks is non-exclusive (e.g. the court or jury
must still decide if a particular risk falls within the statutory definition). 2 7 Furthermore, advances in technology may make an inherent
risk "list" outdated.2 3 Lastly, the statutory language may be so complicated and confusing that it defies practical application. 2 9 The truly
meritorious claim may fall through the cracks. 0
In any event, the group of recreational activities currently covered by Wyoming's Act would have to be limited in order for the
Wyoming legislature to even consider a "legislative approach.' Unlike the Colorado Act which applies only to skiing, the Wyoming Act
covers a non-exclusive list of recreational sports. It would be impossible to effectively list out inherent risks and duties for the nonexclusive group of activities currently included within the Act's coverage. In passing the Act, Wyoming legislators made a conscious tradeoff, but one which should .prove worthwhile if the Act is effectively
interpreted by the judiciary.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Enactment of the Recreation Safety Act in Wyoming is a positive
step. The Act codifies the inherent risk doctrine's, role as a parameter
for defining the scope of a provider's duty. The framework for applying the Act, as proposed in this article, utilizes Wyoming common
law principles to aid in determining the nature of the risk and thus,

236. Should the Wyoming Supreme Court interpret the Act and judicially determine a

particular risk "inherent," such determination would only partially inform providers of legal
duties owed to participants. Farrow, supra note 8, at 85.
237. Of the fourteen state statutes which include a definition and corresponding "list" of
inherent risks, Montana is the only state which includes an exclusive list of inherent risks. See
infra Appendix A. One commentator suggests either leaving the question of which risks are
inherent entirely to the courts, or, in the alternative, including within the statute an all inclusive
list of inherent risks. Faber, supra note 44, at 367.
238. Smissen, supra note 45 § 8.41 at p. 80. Such a list must summon legislative clairvoyance to withstand the test of time.
239. See Pizza v. Wolf Creek Ski Development Corp., 711 P.2d 671 (Colo. 1985). wherein
the Supreme Court of Colorado undertakes an exhaustive study of the myriad of jury instructions submitted by the lower court on Colorado's comprehensive Skier Safety Act. Id. Pretrial
summary disposition seems highly unlikely under the Colorado formula.
240. Tort Reform Test, supra note 121. One lawyer interviewed in regard to Colorado's
comprehensive legislation noted that as a result, many cases have become more expensive to
pursue and more difficult to prove, and commented, -[tjhat in and of itself is going to result
in some cases that have some merit not being pursued." Id.
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the scope of a provider's duty. This framework should allow the
judiciary to effectively utilize common law principles to more precisely define the scope of these duties/responsibilities. Wyoming's judicial approach to this legislation allows the flexible use of such an
analytical framework incorporating common law duty and risk analysis. However, this approach does not provide the type of certainty
present in an alternative legislative approach. Following judicial interpretation, the legislature may need to revisit the Act and re-examine
the balance between constitutional restrictions, deference to the judiciary, and the need for certainty in this increasingly important segment of Wyoming's economy.
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APPENDIX

State
Alaska
Colorado

Connecticut
Idaho

Inherent Risks

Operator Duties

Skier Duties

09.65.135(c)(1)
33-44-103(10)

33-44-106
33-44-107
33-44-108

33-44-109

29-212 (Ch. 538a)

29-211

29-213
29-214

6-1106 (Ch. 11)

6-1103

6-1106
26 § 488
26 § 489

Maine
Massachusetts

Ch. 143 § 71N

Ch. 143 § 710

Michigan

§ 18.48322(2)

§ 18.483(6a)

§ 18.48322(1)

Montana

23-2-736(4)

23-2-733

23-2-736

455A.130

455A.110

225-A:241

225-A:23

225-A:24

New Jersey

5:13-5

5:13-3

5:13-4

New Mexico

24-15-IOB

24-15-7

24-15-10

New York

26 § 867
§ 99C-2(a), (c)

§ 99C-2(b)

53-09-06

53-09-03

53-09-06

4169.08(A)

4169.08(B)

4169.08(C)

30.970(1)

30.990

30.985

41-8-1

41-8-2

68-48-106

68-48-103

Nevada
New Hampshire

N. Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oregon
Rhode Island
Tennessee
Utah

78-27-52(1)

Washington
West Virginia

§ 20-3A-5

78-27-54
70.117.010

70.117.020

§ 20-3A-3

§ 20-3A-5

Wisconsin - Recreational Participant Duties:
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